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ABSTRACT: 
My dissertation includes three chapters on the value premium. In the first chapter, I study 
whether seemingly innocuous decisions in the construction of the original HML portfolio (Fama 
and French, 1993) affect our inference on the value premium. I find that the value premium is 
dramatically smaller than we thought. In sample, the average estimate of the value premium is 
0.09% per month smaller than the original estimate of the value premium. Out of sample, how-
ever, the difference is statistically insignificant. The results suggest that the original value pre-
mium estimate is upward biased because of a chance result in the original research decisions. 
 In the second chapter, I propose an estimate for intangible assets and growth opportunities 
and examine if this estimate improves book-to-market equity as a measure of value. I find that 
portfolios sorted on book equity plus the estimate to market equity have lower returns than 
portfolios sorted on book-to-market equity. The results suggest that intangible assets and growth 
opportunities diminish book-to-market equity as a measure of value because investors value in-
tangible assets and growth opportunities in an overly optimistic way. 
 In my third chapter, I simultaneously study nine explanations of the value effect to better 
understand what the dominant value explanation is. I find that duration accounts for most of the 
value effect and that the eight other explanations account for a negligible part of it. The results 
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Chapter 1: Is the Value Premium Smaller Than We Thought? 
1 Introduction 
The value premium compensates investors for a unit exposure to the value factor. Fama and 
French (1993) propose the HML portfolio as a proxy for the value factor and estimate a 
statistically significant value premium of 0.40% per month using data from July 1963 to December 
1991. 
 The construction of this HML portfolio includes seemingly innocuous decisions that could 
easily have been replaced with alternatives that are just as reasonable. For example, the decision 
to sort stocks into portfolios once a year at the end of June is just as reasonable as the alternative 
to sort stocks into portfolios at the end of each month. I expect ex ante that these decisions and 
their alternatives produce estimates of the value premium that are the same. Empirically, 
however, they may not be the same. If the decisions and their alternatives produce estimates of 
the value premium that are different, then the difference serves as an estimate for the bias that 
is due to chance in the original decisions. This new approach can be extended to any empirical 
study. 
 I study the original value premium estimate because of its academic importance. The Fama 
and French (1993) three-factor model, which includes the original HML portfolio as a proxy for 
the value factor, has been serving as a benchmark asset pricing model in empirical finance. 
Mutual fund studies on performance evaluation, for example Fama and French (2010), include 
the original HML portfolio as a right-hand side variable to proxy for the value factor. Theory 
papers, such as Zhang (2005), provide rationales for why the HML portfolio is a systematic risk 
factor. Bias in the original value premium estimate may therefore affect our inference of the 
three-factor model’s importance as an asset pricing model, on mutual fund managers’ abilities, 




 I estimate the bias of the original value premium estimate that is due to chance in the original 
decisions, because a chance result is always possible in empirical research. Moreover, many 
statistical biases are inherent to research and lead to biased estimates in published papers. 
Harvey’s (2017) AFA Presidential Address elaborates on the file drawer effect, data-mining, 
multiple hypothesis testing, data-snooping, etc. McLean and Pontiff (2016), Harvey, Liu and Zhu 
(2016), and Linnainmaa and Roberts (2018) provide empirical evidence that statistical biases 
explain much of the anomaly returns in published papers. 
 In this paper, I focus on six seemingly innocuous decisions in the construction of the original 
HML portfolio. The first decision is about the timing of market equity, the second decision is 
about the timing of book equity, the third decision is about negative book equity, the fourth 
decision is about financial firms, the fifth decision is about portfolio sorting breakpoints, and the 
sixth decision is about the timing of market equity to account for the size effect. I propose 
alternatives that are just as reasonable, form all possible combinations of these six decisions and 
their alternatives, construct 96 HML portfolios, and collapse all HML portfolios in each month 
into an equally weighted average portfolio. This average HML portfolio is a valuable proxy for the 
value factor because it reflects an average decision that mitigates a bias due to chance in research 
decisions. The average return difference between the original HML portfolio and the average 
HML portfolio is therefore an estimate for the bias of the original value premium estimate. 
 I start my empirical analysis with the replication of the original HML portfolio as described in 
Fama and French (1993). I report that I can largely, but not perfectly, replicate the original HML 
portfolio. The HML portfolio has an average monthly return of 0.40% per month in the original 
study’s sample from July 1963 to December 1991. The replicated HML portfolio has an average 
monthly return of 0.35% per month in the same sample period. The difference may be a result 
of updating the CRSP and Compustat datasets, different links for the merging of both datasets, 




 In the baseline empirical test, I calculate the average monthly returns of the average HML 
portfolio and of the original HML portfolio in the original sample’s study from July 1963 to 
December 1991. I find that the average HML portfolio has an average monthly return of 0.27% 
per month (t-statistic of 1.79). The original HML portfolio has an average monthly return of 0.35% 
per month (t-statistic of 2.53). The average return difference between the original HML portfolio 
and the average HML portfolio is 0.09% per month (t-statistic of 1.88). These findings suggest 
that the original value premium estimate is upward biased, and they also raise doubts as to 
whether the original value premium may even be a false positive. 
 I also perform a White (2000) Reality Check Bootstrap to test the null hypothesis that the 
value premium is zero. This is important because the t-statistic of the average HML portfolio does 
not account for the fact that we have more information than just the average portfolio and 
because the t-statistic of the original HML portfolio does not account for the fact that a 
researcher has the freedom to choose the HML portfolio with the highest t-statistic as a proxy 
for the value factor. I find that the t-statistic of the original HML portfolio exceeds the critical 
value from the Reality Check Bootstrap assuming a confidence level of 95%, and thus it rejects 
the null hypothesis that the value premium is zero. 
 I compare the standard deviations of the original HML portfolio and the average HML 
portfolio to better understand whether the positive return difference is compensation for more 
risk. The original HML portfolio has a lower standard deviation than the average HML portfolio 
(2.57% versus 2.76% per month), and thus suggests that the positive return difference is not 
compensation for more risk. 
 I perform a principal component analysis of the monthly returns of the 96 HML portfolios to 
better understand whether the HML portfolios may be proxying for more than one underlying 
factor. The first principal component explains 91% of the variation of the HML portfolios, and 




 I estimate the main empirical test using data that is out of sample. If the return difference 
between the original and the average HML portfolio is a bias that is due to chance in research 
decisions, then I expect the return difference to be zero out of sample. In the pre-sample, from 
July 1926 to June 1963, the return difference between the original and the average HML portfolio 
is 0.08% per month (t-statistic 1.48). This pre-sample result is somewhat at odds with the idea of 
a bias. The pre-sample estimate, however, may include hindsight biases because Graham and 
Dodd (1934, 1962) and Graham (1949) already reported on value investing back then. In the post-
sample, from January 1992 to December 2019, the return difference between the original and 
the average HML portfolio is 0.06% per month (t-statistic 0.84). The post-sample result is 
consistent with a bias. 
 I also estimate the main empirical test using the full sample from July 1926 to December 2019. 
The average HML portfolio has an average monthly return of 0.25% per month (t-statistic of 2.21). 
The original HML portfolio has an average monthly return of 0.33% per month (t-statistic of 3.31). 
The return difference between the original and the average HML portfolio on average is 0.08% 
per month (t-statistic of 2.27). The full sample results suggest that the original value premium 
estimate is upward biased. 
 In my last empirical test, I use the approach in Barillas and Shanken (2017) and the factors in 
Fama and French (2015) augmented with momentum to better understand if the original HML 
portfolio and the average HML portfolio are spanned. I find that the original and the average HML 
portfolios have almost the same intercepts and that both intercepts are statistically significant. I 
also find that the original HML portfolio’s beta with the momentum factor is much more negative 
than the average HML portfolio’s beta with momentum. These findings suggest that, 
unconditionally, the original HML portfolio has a higher average monthly return than the average 





2 Related Literature 
2.1 Robustness of the Original Value Premium Estimate 
This paper is related to the literature on the robustness of the original value premium estimate 
to address concerns put forth by Black (1993) and by Lo and MacKinlay (1990) that the value 
premium is not real.  
 The tenor of this literature is that the original value premium estimate is robust. Davis, Fama, 
and French (2000) document a significant value premium estimate in the US equity market in the 
sample from 1929 to 1963 that precedes the original study’s sample. Barber and Lyon (1997) 
document a significant value effect in the holdout sample of financial firms in the US equity 
market. Chan, Hamao, and Lakonishok (1991) report a significant value premium estimate in 
Japan’s equity market, which is the second largest equity market in 1990. Fama and French (1998) 
document significant value premium estimates in international equity markets. Asness, 
Moskowitz, and Pedersen (2013) report significant value premium estimates in other asset 
classes. Fama and French (1992) report a significant value effect that is robust to the return 
predictability of leverage, as reported in Bhandari (1988), and of earnings to price, as reported in 
Basu (1977, 1983). Asness and Frazzini (2013) report a significant value premium estimate for an 
updated HML portfolio conditional on momentum. Kessler, Scherer, and Harries (2019) find 
significant returns for valuation-based portfolios with different “design choices.” Fama and 
French (2008) report that the value effect exists in microcap stocks, small stocks, and big stocks, 
using portfolio sorts and cross-sectional regressions conditional on other stock return predictors, 
but Phalippou (2008) documents that the value effect exists only among some of the smallest 
stocks in the US equity market. Studies with more recent samples, however, find insignificant 
value premium estimates. Schwert (2003), Linnainamaa and Roberts (2018), and Fama and 
French (2020) report insignificant value premium estimates in the US equity market in samples 
that follow the original sample’s study. But Fama and French (2020) report a significant value 




 My contribution to the literature is the empirical finding that the value premium is smaller 
than we thought: The construction of the original HML portfolio (Fama and French, 1993) 
includes six seemingly innocuous decisions that could easily have been replaced with alternatives 
that are just as reasonable. In sample, the average estimate of the value premium is dramatically 
smaller than the original estimate of the value premium. The difference is 0.09% per month and 
statistically significant. Out of sample, the estimates of the value premium are similar. These 
results suggest that the original value premium estimate is upward biased due to chance in the 
original decisions. The result has far-reaching academic implications: An upward bias in the 
original value premium estimate reduces the importance of the Fama and French (1993) three-
factor model as a benchmark asset pricing model, it affects our inference of mutual fund 
managers’ abilities, and it reduces the importance of theories on why the value factor is a 
systematic risk factor.  
  
2.2 Approaches to Address Chance or Statistical Biases 
This paper is also related to the literature on approaches to address bias in estimates of published 
papers that are due to chance or statistical biases.  
 Harvey, Liu, and Zhu (2016) propose a t-statistic of 3 as a simple critical value for future 
empirical asset pricing factors to account for multiple testing. They use the number of published 
empirical asset pricing factors over time as a conservative estimate for the number of tested 
asset pricing factors and study the approaches by Bonferroni (1936), Holmes (1979), and 
Benjamini and Yekutieli (2001). Chordia, Goyal, and Saretto (2020) simulate 2.4 million trading 
strategies, use a model to infer the number of strategies that are tested by financial economists, 
and propose a t-statistic of 3.8 as a critical value for hypothesis tests. Harvey and Liu (2020) use 
a bootstrap approach and propose t-statistics as critical values that depend on the researcher’s 
prior belief of the fraction of real anomalies and on their type I and type II error requirements. 




 My contribution to the literature is a new approach to estimating the bias in the original 
estimate of the value premium that is attributable to chance in research decisions. This new 
approach is simple and intuitive: Ex ante, I expect that the decisions and their reasonable 
alternatives produce estimates of the value premium that are the same. If they are not the same, 
then the original estimate may be biased or even a false positive that occurs because of a chance 
result in the original decisions. This new approach is applicable in sample, and it can be extended 
to any empirical study. 
 My approach is related to robustness tests in general. Fama and French (1992), for example, 
report that the book-to-market effect is robust to replacing end of December market equity with 
fiscal year-end market equity. Pontiff and Singla (2019), as another example, report that the 
original estimate of the liquidity premium (Pastor and Stambaugh, 2003) is statistically 
insignificant when they introduce four modifications into the construction of the liquidity factor 
proxy that are expected to improve statistical power or to reduce estimation error. My approach 
is different, however, because it studies seemingly innocuous decisions that have alternatives 
that are just as reasonable and because it aggregates all decisions and alternatives into one 
estimate. 
 
3 HML Portfolios 
3.1 Definition of the Original HML Portfolio 
The original HML portfolio is defined in Fama and French (1993). It uses data from the 
intersection of CRSP and Compustat. The sample is restricted to common ordinary US stocks 
(share code 10 or 11) that are trading on the NYSE, the NASDAQ, and the Amex (exchange code 
1, 2, or 3) with non-missing and non-negative book equity, non-missing market equity at the end 





 The original HML portfolio is the average return of a small and a big value portfolio minus the 
average return of a small and a big growth portfolio in each month. Formally, HML = 1/2 (Small 
Value + Big Value) - 1/2 (Small Growth + Big Growth). Stocks are sorted into six portfolios by 
independently sorting them on market equity into small and big stocks using the median market 
capitalization of all stocks traded on the NYSE as breakpoint and by independently sorting them 
on book-to-market equity into value, neutral, and growth stocks using the 30th and 70th 
percentiles of book-to-market equity of all stocks traded on the NYSE as breakpoints. The 
portfolios are constructed at the end of June of year t and are held from July of year t to June of 
year t+1. Market equity observed at the end of June of year t is used to sort stocks on size. The 
book equity of a firm’s last fiscal year with fiscal year-end before the end of December of year t-1 
divided by market equity at the end of December of year t-1 is used to sort stocks on value. The 
two neutral portfolios (Small Neutral and Big Neutral) are not used. The six portfolios are value 
weighted. 
 Book equity is defined as stockholder equity (seq), plus balance sheet deferred taxes and 
investment tax credit (txditc) if available, minus the book value of preferred stock. The book value 
of preferred stock is the redemption (pstkrv), liquidation (pstkl), or par value (pstk), if available, 
in that order. Market equity is price times shares outstanding. 
  
3.2 Alternatives that are Just as Reasonable 
The construction of the original HML portfolio includes seemingly innocuous decisions that could 
easily have been replaced with alternatives that are just as reasonable. I identified the following 
six decisions, and I propose alternatives that are just as reasonable. 
 The first decision is about the timing of book equity. The original HML portfolio uses the book 
equity of a firm’s last fiscal year with fiscal year-end before the end of December of year t-1 to 
sort stocks into value and growth portfolios from July of year t to June of year t+1. As an 




after its fiscal year-end. Both specifications impose a minimum gap of six months for accounting 
information to become publicly available in order to address reporting issues documented in 
Alford, Jones, and Zmijewski (1992). Apple Inc., for example, has its last fiscal year-end on 
September 28th, 2019. The firm’s press release on October 30th, 2019 gives relevant accounting 
information, including shareholders’ equity. The original HML portfolio uses this book equity 
observation at the end of June of year 2020 for portfolio sorts, nine months after Apple Inc.’s 
fiscal year ended. The alternative decision uses book equity at the end of March 2020 for portfolio 
sorts, six months after the firm’s fiscal year ended. 
 The second decision is about the timing of market equity. The original HML portfolio uses 
market equity at the end of December of year t-1 as a simple way to match the timing of book 
equity. Specifically, market equity at the end of December of year t-1 is used in the denominator 
of book-to-market equity to sort stocks into value and growth portfolios from July of year t to 
June of year t+1. As an alternative that is just as reasonable, I use market equity from the most 
recent month and skip one month. I skip one month to avoid the negative first-order serial 
correlation in monthly stock returns documented in Jegadeesh (1990). The alternative is similar 
to Asness and Frazzini (2013), who use market equity from the most recent month in the 
denominator of book-to-market equity to have a more updated value portfolio. They argue that 
a stock may be a growth stock at the end of December, but a value stock at the end of June or 
later if negative information about the firm emerges. They report average portfolio returns 
conditional on momentum, but they do not report average portfolio returns unconditionally and 
they do not motivate momentum as a right-hand side variable. Also, Fama and French (1992, p. 
430) include a short discussion about potential issues regarding the timing of market equity. They 
mention that their results are robust to using market equity of a firm’s fiscal year-end in the 
denominator of book-to-market equity, but they do not mention the robustness to using market 




 The third decision is about firms with negative book equity. The original HML portfolio 
excludes stocks with negative book equity observations. As an alternative, I include them. Firms 
can naturally and legally have negative book equity under US GAAP. Revlon Inc., for example, 
reported negative shareholder equity in 2013. Hewlett-Packard, as another example, reported 
negative shareholder equity in 2016. 
 The fourth decision is about financial firms. The original HML portfolio includes financial firms. 
As an alternative, I exclude financial firms (defined as firms with a one-digit SIC code of 6). This 
alternative is consistent with the decision to exclude financial firms in Fama and French (1992, p. 
429) “… because the high leverage that is normal for these firms probably does not have the same 
meaning as for nonfinancial firms, where high leverage more likely indicates distress.” Barber and 
Lyon (1997) study the book-to-market equity effect for the holdout sample of financial firms and 
find empirical support for the value effect. They do not reject the null hypothesis that financial 
firms and non-financial firms have differential value effects. 
 The fifth decision is about the book-to-market equity breakpoints that are used to sort stocks 
into value, neutral, and growth portfolios. The original HML portfolio uses the 30th and 70th 
percentiles of book-to-market equity of all stocks trading on the NYSE as breakpoints. As an 
alternative, I use the 20th and 80th percentiles and the 40th and 60th percentiles of book-to-market 
equity of all stocks trading on the NYSE as breakpoints. 
 The sixth decision is about the timing of market equity to sort stocks into small and big 
portfolios in order to account for the size effect. The original HML portfolio uses market equity 
at the end of June of year t. As an alternative, I use market equity at the end of December of year 
t-1. Banz (1981) is the first study on the size effect, and it uses market equity at the end of 
December of year t-1 as a proxy for the size effect. 
 Many decisions in the definition of the original HML portfolio do not have an alternative that 
is just as reasonable. The decision to use book equity, for example, does not have an alternative 




market equity as the firm’s market value. Earnings, cashflows, or dividends are different 
accounting variables and lead to different anomaly portfolios, and thus they are not alternatives 
that are just as reasonable. If the value premium estimate decreases upon replacing book equity 
with earnings, cashflows, or dividends, then this decrease is not about a chance result in research 
decisions but about different anomaly portfolios. As a second example, replacing book-to-market 
equity with an industry-demeaned book-to-market equity, as in Asness, Porters, and Stevens 
(2000), is not an alternative that is just as reasonable because it accounts for the heterogeneity 
in accounting practices across industries. As a third example, excluding penny stocks is not an 
alternative that is just as reasonable because this is about stock return predictability among 
illiquid stocks and because it leaves out information in the construction of a proxy for a systematic 
risk factor. As a fourth example, using breakpoints that are not based on stocks trading on the 
NYSE is not an alternative that is just as reasonable because this is about stock return 
predictability among stocks that are costly to trade. See Hou, Xue, and Zhang (2018). 
 Kessler, Scherer, and Harries (2019) study how “design choices” affect valuation-based 
portfolio returns. These design choices are not about alternatives that are just as reasonable. The 
design choices include different accounting variables (book equity, cyclically adjusted earnings, 
operating earnings, earnings, dividends, cash flows, earnings to growth, etc.), different sector 
adjustments (unadjusted, subtract the industry median, etc.), different transformations 
(unadjusted, z-score, percentile rank, etc.), using a different portfolio for the short leg (shorting 
the growth portfolio, shorting the market portfolio, etc.), different exposures (cash neutral, beta 
neutral, risk neutral, etc.), and different rebalancing frequencies (monthly, quarterly, annual). 
 
3.3 Snapshot of Decisions in the Literature 
Table I provides a snapshot of the decisions in the empirical literature on the value effect in the 
1980s and early 1990s. The heterogeneity in researchers’ decisions is consistent with alternatives 







The table reports all empirical studies on the value effect that are referenced in Fama and French 
(1992, 1993) in order to include the most relevant of a large number of empirical studies. Column 
(1) lists the author(s), the publication year, and the academic journal. Column (2) reports the 
month in which the portfolio is rebalanced. Most studies rebalance their portfolios once a year 
at the end of December, March, April, or June. Rosenberg, Reid, and Lanstein (1985) sort stocks 
into portfolios at the end of each month. Column (3) reports on the timing of the accounting 
information. Studies use accounting information from fiscal year-ends before the end of 
December or March, from the previous fiscal year, or hand-collected accounting information 
from fiscal year-ends from the previous month. Column (4) reports on the timing of market 
equity. Studies use market equity at the end of December, June, March, or the previous month. 
Column (5) reports if observations with negative accounting information are excluded. Some 
studies include negative observations, some exclude negative observations, and some sort them 
into a separate portfolio. Column (6) reports if financial firms are excluded. Some studies include 
financial firms and some exclude them. Column (7) reports on the timing of market equity to 
account for the size effect. Studies use market equity at the end of December, March, June, or 
the previous month. 
  
3.4 Replication Validation of the Original HML Portfolio 
Table II reports the average monthly return of the original HML portfolio as reported in Fama and 
French (1993, p. 13) and the average monthly return of my replicated HML portfolio in the 
original study’s sample from July 1963 to December 1991. The original HML portfolio has an 




of 0.35% over the same time period. The difference is 0.05% per month. Therefore, I report that 




 Next, I compare the average monthly return of my replicated HML portfolio with the average 
monthly return of the HML portfolios of eight studies that also replicate the original HML 
portfolio. Table II reports that my replicated HML portfolio has a monthly return that is, on 
average, 0.04% per month below that of the eight other studies. 
 What explains this difference? One explanation for the difference is the way CRSP and 
Compustat is merged. I merge them using links from the CRSP/Compustat Merged Database 
available on WRDS because the permno-gvkey links are researched by CRSP or by Compustat. A 
second explanation is that I use returns that are adjusted for delistings and for missing delistings. 
A third explanation for the difference is that the CRSP and Compustat datasets are updated over 
time. A fourth explanation is the details about the construction are left out, similar to many other 
studies.  
 I also noticed that the last five of the eight studies (marked with an asterisk) in Table II say 
that they replicate the HML portfolio as in Fama and French (1993) but then mention that they 
are using the book equity definition found in Davis, Fama, and French (2000). This book equity 
definition is more inclusive of smaller stocks for which the value effect is more pronounced. This 
is another explanation for why the average monthly return of my replicated HML portfolio is 
lower compared to the other studies. The average difference is reduced to 0.01% per month once 





4 Is the Original Value Premium Estimate Biased? 
4.1 Main Empirical Findings 
Table III reports Fama and MacBeth (1973) regressions of the monthly returns of the 96 HML 
portfolios on a constant and a dummy variable that is one for the original HML portfolio and zero 
otherwise, from July 1963 to December 1991. Equation (1) defines the regression specification. 
The dependent variable, Rit, is the return of HML portfolio i in month t. 
 
!"# = %&'()*') + , ⋅ ./010'*2	456	7899:"# + ;"#                   (1) 
 
 The constant is the average monthly return of the average HML portfolio, and thus an 
estimate for the value premium. If the value premium exists, I expect to find a constant that is 
statistically significant. If the value premium does not exist, however, I expect to find a constant 
that is insignificant.  
 The slope on the dummy variable for the original HML portfolio is the average monthly return 
difference between the original HML portfolio and the average HML portfolio in each month, and 
thus an estimate of the bias due to chance in the original decisions. If the original value premium 
estimate is biased, then I expect to find a slope estimate that is statistically significant. If the 
original value premium estimate is not biased due to chance in the original decisions, I expect to 
find a slope estimate that is insignificant. 
  Fama and MacBeth (1973) regressions produce t-statistics that account for the 
contemporaneous correlation in the residuals. Petersen (2009) shows analytically and 
numerically that the standard errors of these estimates account for the cross-sectional 







 Column (1) estimates a constant of 0.27% per month with a t-statistic of 1.79 when all HML 
portfolios are used as proxies for the value factor. Column (2) estimates a value premium of 
0.35% per month with a t-statistic of 2.53 when only the original HML portfolio is used as a proxy 
for the value factor. Column (3) reports a slope estimate of 0.09% per month with a t-statistic of 
1.88. These findings suggest therefore that the original estimate of the value premium is upward 
biased. They also raise doubts as to the statistical significance of the original estimate. 
 My empirical findings are robust to using the book equity definition of Davis, Fama, and 
French (2000) in the definition of the HML portfolio. See Table II in the Appendix for the results.  
 
4.2 Illustration of the Main Finding 
Figure I shows a histogram of the monthly average returns of each of the 96 HML portfolios from 
July 1963 to December 1991. The original HML portfolio is marked with “HML”, and the average 
HML portfolio is marked with “AHML”. 
 The average monthly returns of the 96 HML portfolios range from 0.16% to 0.40%. I find that 
86 of the 96 HML portfolios have returns that are below the original value premium estimate and 
that 10 HML portfolios have returns that are above it. The average return of the average HML 
portfolio is 0.27% per month and much lower than the average return of the original HML 
portfolio. This is consistent with the idea that the original estimate of the value premium is 




4.3 White (2000) Reality Check Bootstrap 
I additionally perform the White (2000) Reality Check Bootstrap to test the null hypothesis that 




not account for the fact that we have more information that the just average portfolio (Table III, 
column 1) and because the t-statistic on the slope estimate (Table III, column 2) does not account 
for the fact that a researcher has the freedom to choose the HML portfolio with the highest 
t-statistic as a proxy for the value factor. 
 The White (2000) Reality Check Bootstrap provides a way to calculate a critical value for the 
null hypothesis that the value premium is zero that accounts for the researcher’s freedom to 
choose the HML portfolio with the highest t-statistic as a proxy for the value factor. The bootstrap 
procedure works as follow: I first demean each of the 96 HML portfolios so that no value effect 
exists in my sample by construction. I then draw a random sample of months with replacement, 
calculate the average returns and the t-statistics of each of the 96 HML portfolios, and take the 
highest t-statistic as the tmax-statistic. I repeat this bootstrap 1,000 times. Eventually, I calculate 
the 95th percentile of all the tmax-statistics and use it as the critical value for the hypothesis test. 
 Figure II shows the histogram of the bootstrapped tmax-statistics under the null hypothesis 
that no value premium exists from July 1963 to December 1991. The 95th percentile of the 
tmax-statistics is 2.12. The original HML portfolio has a t-statistic of 2.53. This t-statistic exceeds 
the critical value and leads therefore to the rejection of the null hypothesis that the value 




4.4 Compensation for Risk 
To address the concern that the higher returns of the original relative to the average HML 
portfolio may be compensation for more risk, I compare the return standard deviation and the 
Sharpe ratio of the original HML portfolio with the average HML portfolio (AHML) for the sample 
from July 1963 to December 1991. If the higher returns of the original HML portfolio are 




Sharpe ratio. Table IV reports that the standard deviation of the HML portfolio is lower than that 
of the average HML portfolio (2.57% versus 2.76% per month) and that the Sharpe ratio of the 
original HML portfolio is larger than that of the average HML portfolio (0.14 versus 0.10). These 
findings are difficult to reconcile with a risk explanation, but they are consistent with the 




4.5 One Common Factor 
I study the common variation in the monthly returns of the 96 HML portfolios to better 
understand whether the 96 HML portfolios are proxying for one or for many risk factors. 
 Specifically, I perform a principal component analysis of the monthly returns of the 96 HML 
portfolios from July 1963 to December 1991. Table V reports that the first principal component 
explains 91% of the variation in the monthly returns, the second principal component explains 
5%, the third principal component explains 1%, and each of the remaining 93 principal 
components explain less than 1% of the variation. These findings suggest that the 96 HML 




 I also find an average pairwise correlation of 0.91 for the monthly returns of the 96 HML 
portfolios from July 1963 to December 1991. This correlation is high compared to the average 
pairwise correlations among different anomaly portfolios, and it suggests that the 96 HML 
portfolios are all proxies for one common factor. McLean and Pontiff (2016) report an average 
correlation of 0.03 across 97 different anomaly portfolios, and Green, Hand, and Zhang (2017) 





4.6 Out-Of-Sample Evidence 
I estimate the main empirical test using data that is outside of the original study’s sample period. 
If the value premium exists, I expect to find statistically significant constants out of sample. If the 
value premium does not exist, however, I expect to find constants that are statistically 
insignificant out of sample. If the original value premium estimate is biased due to a chance result 
in the original decisions, I expect to find an insignificant slope estimate out of sample. Otherwise, 
I expect to find a statistically significant slope estimates out of sample. 
 Table VI reports Fama and MacBeth (1973) regressions of the monthly returns of the 96 HML 
portfolios on a constant and a dummy variable that is one for the original HML portfolio and zero 
otherwise. The pre-sample is July 1926 to June 1963, and the post-sample is January 1992 to 
December 2019. The pre-Compustat book equity data is from Kenneth French’s webpage, and I 




 Columns (1) and (4) estimate a value premium of 0.33% per month with a t-statistic of 1.45 
in the pre-sample and a value premium of 0.14% per month with a t-statistic of 0.75 in the post-
sample. The pre-sample t-statistic suggests that the value premium exists, but the post-sample 
t-statistic suggests that the value premium does not exist. 
 Columns (2) and (5) estimate a value premium of 0.41% per month with a t-statistic of 1.99 
in the pre-sample and 0.20% per month with a t-statistic of 1.16 in the post-sample when the 
original HML portfolio is used as a proxy for the underlying value factor. The pre-sample finding 
is consistent with Davis, Fama, and French (2000). The post-sample result is consistent with Fama 
and French (2020). They report an insignificant value premium of 0.10% per month for the post-




proxy for the value factor (Table 1 on p. 15, MV-MG = 0.11-0.01 = 0.10). The post-sample findings 
are also consistent with Linnainmaa and Roberts (2018), who report that the original HML 
portfolio has an average monthly return of 0.31% per month with a t-statistic of 1.71 in the post-
sample, and they are consistent with Schwert (2003), who reports an insignificant value effect 
for the sample from 1994 to 2002.  
 Columns (3) and (6) estimate a bias of 0.08% per month with a t-statistic of 1.69 in the pre-
sample and a bias of 0.06% per month with a t-statistic of 0.76 in the post-sample. The pre-
sample slope estimate is similar to the in-sample slope estimate, which is at odds with an 
estimation bias in the original value premium estimate. It is not clear, however, whether the pre-
sample produces an independent estimate of the value premium because Graham and Dodd 
(1934, 1962) and Graham (1949) already reported on value investing for the pre-sample. The 
post-sample estimate is smaller and statistically insignificant, and thus suggests that the return 
difference between the original and the average HML portfolios is an estimate for the bias due 
to chance in the original decisions. 
 I also study the robustness of my findings to using different start dates. Davis, Fama, and 
French (2000) use July 1929 as a start date because they need the first three years to estimate 
betas. My results are robust to using July 1929 as start date. Cohen, Polk, and Vuolteenaho (2003) 
report that the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 was enacted to ensure accurate accounting 
information. They characterize the first two years after that act as an enforcement period and 
determine that accounting information from 1937 is of sufficiently high quality for empirical 
research. My results are robust to using July 1938 as the start date. 
 I also acknowledge that the positive return difference between the original and the average 
HML portfolio in the pre- and in the original sample period, and the lower return difference in 
the post-sample period are consistent with McLean and Pontiff’s (2016) assertion that 




on it. Fama and French (2020) argue that the post-sample decline of value minus growth 
portfolios is economically large but not statistically significant. 
 
4.7 Individual Decisions 
I study how much each of the six decisions accounts for the return difference between the 
original and the average HML portfolio. Table VII reports Fama and MacBeth (1973) regressions 
of the monthly returns of the 96 HML portfolios on a constant and six dummy variables for each 




 Columns (1) to (5) report estimates of the six dummy variables individually, and column (6) 
reports estimates for the six dummy variables jointly. Four out of six slope estimates are close to 
zero, which is consistent with the researcher’s expectation that alternative decisions will lead to 
the same empirical finding as the original decisions. The slope on the second dummy variable 
about the timing of market equity in the denominator of book-to-market equity is 0.11% per 
month with a t-statistic of 1.62. This effect is economically large but is not statistically significant 
at the 95 percent confidence level. The slope on the sixth dummy variable about the timing of 
market equity to account for the size effect is 0.05% per month with a t-statistic of 2.96. This 
effect is statistically significant at the 5% significance level. This finding is related to Gerakos and 
Linnainmaa (2018), who report that most of the value premium estimate is driven by changes in 
market equity. The empirical findings also suggest that decisions with more “degrees of 
freedom”, for example decisions that use monthly stock market data compared to annual 





4.8 Robustness to Cross-Sectional Slope Estimates 
The empirical tests use monthly portfolio returns as the dependent variable. As a robustness test, 
I use the monthly slope estimates from cross-sectional regressions of one-month ahead returns 
on each of the individual value measures as the dependent variable. Fama (1976) argues that 
these slope estimates are returns from long-short portfolios with an exposure of one to the 
underlying value factor. 
 Specifically, I estimate monthly cross-sectional regressions of one-month ahead returns on 
the natural logarithm of each of 48 value measures and on the natural logarithm of market equity 
using all but microcap stocks from July 1963 to December 1991. Microcap stocks are defined as 
stocks with market equity below the 20th percentile of market equity using all stocks trading on 
the NYSE. I have 48 value measures compared to the 96 HML portfolios, because the fifth decision 
on breakpoints to sort stocks into value, neutral, and growth portfolios is not used in cross-
sectional regressions. I exclude microcap stocks as a simple way to account for the unique 
weighting that is used in the construction of the original HML portfolio. The original HML portfolio 
is constructed by equal weighting two long and two short portfolios (Small Value and Big Value, 
Small Growth and Big Growth), and these four portfolios are constructed by value weighting 
stocks. 
 Table VIII reports Fama and MacBeth (1973) regressions of the monthly slope estimates on a 
constant and a dummy variable that is one for the slope estimates that are consistent with the 
original HML portfolio returns. The t-statistics are based on Newey-West adjusted standard 




 Column (1) estimates a value premium of 0.18% per month with a t-statistic of 1.94. 




measure that is consistent with the original HML portfolio. Column (3) estimates a bias of 0.08% 
per month with a t-statistic of 3.68. My main results are therefore robust to using monthly slope 
estimates from cross-sectional regressions instead of portfolios returns. 
 
4.9 Full Sample Evidence 
I estimate the main regression specification using data from the full sample from July 1926 to 
December 2019. Table IX reports the empirical results. Column (1) estimates a value premium of 
0.25% per month with a t-statistic of 2.06. Column (2) estimates a value premium of 0.33% per 
month with a t-statistic of 2.85 when the original HML portfolio is used as a proxy for the value 
factor. Column (3) estimates a bias of 0.08% per month with a t-statistic of 2.32. These findings 
suggest that the value premium exists, but that the original estimate of the value premium is 
upward biased due to chance in the original decisions. 
 Figure III shows the histogram of the tmax-statistics from the White (2000) Reality Check 
Bootstrap under the null hypothesis that no value premium exists from July 1926 to December 
2019. The 95th percentile of the tmax-statistics is 1.95. The original HML portfolio has a t-statistic 
of 3.13. This t-statistic exceed the critical value and leads therefore to the rejection of the null 





5 Spanning Regressions 
I use the approach in Barillas and Shanken (2017) and the Fama and French (2015) five-factor 




HML portfolio are spanned by the model. I use asset pricing factor returns from Kenneth French’s 
website. 
 
[Table X]  
 
 Table X reports the empirical results. First, I find that the original HML portfolio and the 
average HML portfolio are not priced by the five-factor model augmented with momentum in 
most of the subsamples and in the full sample. The portfolios, however, are priced in the post-
sample. And the original HML portfolio is also priced in the Compustat sample. This is consistent 
with Fama and French’s (2015) finding that the HML portfolio is redundant in the five-factor 
model. This finding suggests that the original and the average HML portfolio help explain 
expected returns conditional on the factors in the augmented five-factor model.  
 Second, I find that the intercepts of the average HML portfolio are similar or slightly larger 
than the intercepts of the original HML portfolio. This suggests that the incremental value of the 
average HML portfolio over the original HML portfolio is zero or small conditional on the 
augmented five-factor model. 
 Third, I find that the average HML portfolio has a much more negative beta with the 
momentum factor compared to the original HML portfolio. This suggests that the original HML 
portfolio has higher unconditional returns than the average HML portfolio, because it avoids 
trading against momentum. 
 The question whether momentum is an asset pricing factor is under debate. On the one hand, 
Fama and French (2018, p. 237) are reluctant to accept momentum as an asset pricing factor, 
arguing that momentum lacks economic motivation as an asset pricing factor and that 
recognizing momentum as an asset pricing factor marks the beginning of mining the data for 
factors. Griffin, Ji, and Martin (2003) argue that international momentum portfolios are not 




that momentum can be motivated as an asset pricing factor in a model in which investors 
evaluate risk according to prospect theory. Jegadeesh and Titman (2010) document that 







The value premium compensates investors for a unit exposure to the value factor. Fama and 
French (1993) propose the HML portfolio as a proxy for the value factor and estimate a 
statistically significant value premium of 0.40% per month using data from July 1963 to December 
1991. 
 The construction of this HML portfolio includes seemingly innocuous decisions that could 
easily have be replaced with alternatives that are just as reasonable. I expect ex ante that these 
decisions and their alternatives produce estimates of the value premium that are the same. If the 
estimates are not the same, however, then the difference is an estimate for the bias that is due 
to chance in the original decisions. This new approach can be extended to any empirical study. 
 I study the value premium because of its academic importance. Bias in the original value 
premium estimate affects our inference on the importance of the Fama and French (1993) three-
factor model, on the abilities of mutual fund managers, and on the relevance of theories that 
provide rationales for why the value factor is a systematic risk factor. I study the bias of the 
original value premium estimate that is due to chance in research decisions, because a chance 
result is always possible in empirical research. Moreover, many statistical biases are inherent to 
research and lead to biased estimates in published papers. Harvey’s (2017) AFA Presidential 
Address elaborates on some of these biases, including the file drawer effect, data-mining, 
multiple hypothesis testing, data-snooping, etc. 
 In this paper, I focus on six seemingly innocuous decisions in the construction of the original 
HML portfolio. The first decision is about the timing of market equity, the second decision is 
about the timing of book equity, the third decisions is about negative book equity, the fourth 
decision is about financial firms, the fifth decision is about portfolio sorting breakpoints, and the 
sixth decision is about the timing of market equity to account for the size effect. I propose 
alternatives that are just as reasonable, create all possible combinations of the decisions and 




each month into an average HML portfolio. This average HML portfolio is a valuable proxy for the 
value factor because it reflects an average decision that mitigates a bias due to chance in research 
decisions. The average return difference between the original HML portfolio and the average 
HML portfolio is therefore an estimate for the bias of the original value premium estimate. 
 The average HML portfolio has an average monthly return of 0.27% per month (t-statistic of 
1.79) in the original study’s sample. The original HML portfolio has an average monthly return of 
0.35% per month (t-statistic of 2.53). The average return difference between the original and the 
average HML portfolio is 0.09% per month (t-statistic of 1.88). These findings suggest that the 
original value premium is positively biased. 
 The White (2000) Reality Check Bootstrap also leads to the rejection of the null hypothesis 
that the value premium is zero. This is important because the t-statistic of the average HML 
portfolio does not account that we have more information than just the average portfolio and 
because the t-statistic of the original HML portfolio does not account for a researcher’s freedom 
in choosing the HML portfolio with the highest t-statistic as a proxy for the underlying value 
factor. 
 I estimate the main empirical test using data that is out of sample. If the return difference 
between the original and the average HML portfolio is a bias that is due to chance in research 
decisions, then I expect the return difference to be zero out of sample. In the pre-sample, from 
July 1926 to June 1963, the return difference between the original and the average HML portfolio 
is 0.08% per month (t-statistic of 1.48). This pre-sample result is somewhat at odds with the idea 
of a bias. The pre-sample estimate, however, may include hindsight biases, because Graham and 
Dodd (1934, 1962) and Graham (1949) already reported on value investing back then. In the post-
sample, from January 1992 to December 2019, the return difference between the original and 
the average HML portfolio is 0.06% per month (t-statistic of 0.84). The post-sample result is 




 In the full sample, from July 1927 to December 2019, the average HML portfolio has an 
average monthly return of 0.25% (t-statistic of 2.21) and the average return difference between 
the original and the average HML portfolio is 0.08% per month (t-statistic of 2.27). This suggests 
that the original value premium estimate is upward biased but the original estimate is not a false 
positive. 
 In my last empirical test, I use the approach in Barillas and Shanken (2017) and the factors in 
Fama and French (2015) augmented with momentum to better understand if the original HML 
portfolio and the average HML portfolio are spanned. I find that the original and the average HML 
portfolios have almost the same intercepts and that both intercepts are statistically significant. I 
also find that the original HML portfolio’s beta with the momentum factor is much more negative 
than the average HML portfolio’s beta with momentum. These findings suggest that, 
unconditionally, the original HML portfolio has a higher average monthly return than the average 
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 Seemingly Innocuous Decisions in the Construction of the HML Portfolio, 1963 to 1991 
This histogram shows the average monthly returns of 96 HML portfolios from July 1963 to 
December 1991. The construction of the original HML portfolio (Fama and French, 1993) includes 
six seemingly innocuous decisions that could easily have been replaced with alternatives that are 
just as reasonable. I propose such alternatives, form all possible combinations of the six decisions 
and their alternatives, and construct 96 HML portfolios. The original HML portfolio (marked as 
“HML”) has an average monthly return of 0.35% per month (t-statistic of 2.53). The average HML 
portfolio (marked as “AHML”) has an average monthly return of 0.27% per month (t-statistic of 
2.53). The average return difference between the original and the average HML portfolio is 0.09% 














Reality Check Bootstrap for the Original HML Portfolio, 1963 to 1991 
This histogram shows bootstrapped tmax-statistics of a White (2000) Reality Check Bootstrap for 
the 96 HML portfolios under the null hypothesis that the value premium is zero. The original HML 
portfolio (marked as “HML”) has t-statistic of 2.53. The 95th percentile of the tmax-statistics is 2.12 
and marked with a red line. It serves as the critical value of a hypothesis test that considers 
multiple testing and that assumes a confidence level of 95%. The White (2000) reality check 
bootstrap procedure is as follows: I first demean each of the 96 HML portfolios. I then bootstrap 
months with replacement, calculate the mean return and its t-statistic for each of the 96 









Reality Check Bootstrap for the Original HML Portfolio, 1963 to 2019 
This histogram shows bootstrapped tmax-statistics of a White (2000) Reality Check Bootstrap for 
the 96 HML portfolios under the null hypothesis that the value premium is zero. The original HML 
portfolio (marked as “HML”) has t-statistic of 3.13. The 95th percentile of the tmax-statistics is 1.95 
and marked with a red line. It serves as the critical value of a hypothesis test that considers 
multiple testing and that assumes a confidence level of 95%. The White (2000) reality check 
bootstrap procedure is as follows: I first demean each of the 96 HML portfolios. I then bootstrap 
months with replacement, calculate the mean return and its t-statistic for each of the 96 









Snapshot of Decisions in the Related Studies, 1981 to 1993 
This table provides a snapshot of the decisions in the empirical literature. I report all empirical studies on valuation 
anomalies that are referenced in Fama and French (1992, 1993) to include the most relevant empirical studies as of the 
beginning of the early 1990s. Column (1) names the author(s), the publication year, and the academic journal. Column 
(2) reports the month in which stocks are sorted into portfolios. Column (3) reports the month from which the 
accounting variable is that is used for the portfolio sorts. Column (4) reports the month from which month market 
equity is that is used for the portfolio sorts. Column (5) reports if observations with negative accounting information 
are excluded. Column (6) reports if financial firms are excluded. Column (7) reports the month from which market 
equity is to control for the size effect. 














Fama and French (1993, JFE) Jun t Dec t-1 Dec t-1 Exclude Include Jun t 
Fama and French (1992, JF) Jun t Dec t-1 Dec t-1 Exclude Exclude Jun t 
Chan, Hamao, and Lakonishok (1991, JF) Jun t Mar t Jun t Separate Include Jun t 
Jaffe, Keim, and Westerfield (1989, JF) Mar t Dec t-1 Mar t Separate Include Mar t 





Include Include Dec t 





Separate Include Dec t 














This table reports the average monthly return (in percentages) of the original HML portfolio 
reported in Fama and French (1993, p. 13) and compares it with the average monthly return of 
the replicated HML portfolio, as well as with the average monthly returns of HML portfolios 
reported in eight additional papers. Column (1) names the authors, the publication year, and the 
academic journal of the study. Column (2) reports the time horizon that is used in each study. 
Column (3) reports the average monthly return of the HML portfolio over the time horizon of the 
study as reported in the study. Column (4) reports the average monthly return of my replicated 
HML portfolio over the same time horizon as in each study. The last five studies use the book 
equity definition as in Davis, Fama, and French (2000), which is different from the book equity 
definition that is used for the original HML portfolio as in Fama and French (1993). I mark these 
five studies with an asterisk. 
Study Time Period of Each Study 
HML Return 
in Each Study 
Replicated 
HML Return Diff. 
Fama and French (1993, JFE) 07/63-12/91 0.40 0.35 -0.05 
Fama and French (1995, JF) 07/63-12/92 0.44 0.40 -0.04 
Fama and French (1996, JF) 07/63-12/93 0.46 0.43 -0.03 
Fama and French (1997, JFE) 07/63-12/94 0.45 0.41 -0.04 
Davis, Fama, and French (2000, JF)* 07/63-06/97 0.43 0.39 -0.04 
Fama and French (2015, JFE)* 07/63-12/13 0.37 0.35 -0.02 
Linnainmaa and Roberts (2018, RFS)* 07/63-12/16 0.36 0.34 -0.02 
Gerakos and Linnainmaa (2018, RFS)* 07/63-12/16 0.37 0.34 -0.03 
Ball, Gerakos, Linnainmaa, and 
Nikolaev (2019, JFE)* 07/64-12/17 0.37 0.31 -0.06 






Seemingly Innocuous Decisions in the Construction of the HML Portfolio, 1963 to 1991 
This table reports Fama and MacBeth (1973) regressions of the monthly returns (in percentage) 
of 96 HML portfolios on a constant and on a dummy variable that is one for the original HML 
portfolio, from July 1963 to December 1991.  
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The construction of the original HML portfolio (Fama and French, 1993) includes six seemingly 
innocuous decisions that could easily have been replaced with alternatives that are just as 
reasonable. I propose such alternatives, form all possible combinations of the six decisions and 
their alternatives, and construct 96 HML portfolios. Note that column (2) suppresses the constant 
in the regression. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. White (2000) Reality Check Bootstrap 
p-values are reported in square brackets. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) 
     
Constant 0.27  0.27 
 (1.79)  (1.79) 
Original HML Dummy  0.35 0.09 
  (2.53) (1.88) 
    







Compensation for Risk Explanation, 1963 to 1991 
This table reports the average monthly return, standard deviation, and the Sharpe ratio of the 
original HML portfolio and of the average HML portfolio in the original study’s sample from July 
1963 to December 1991. The construction of the original HML portfolio includes six seemingly 
innocuous decisions that could easily have been replaced with alternatives that are just as 
reasonable. I propose such alternatives, form all possible combinations of the six decisions and 
their alternatives, construct 96 HML portfolios, and finally collapse the 96 HML portfolios in each 
month into an equally weighted average HML portfolio. 
 
Portfolio Average Standard Deviation Sharpe Ratio 
Original HML Portfolio 0.35 2.57 0.14 




Principal Component Analysis of 96 HML Portfolios, 1963 to 1991 
This table reports estimation results of a principal component analysis of the monthly returns of 
96 HML portfolio in the original study’s sample from July 1963 to December 1991. The 
construction of the original HML portfolio includes six seemingly innocuous decisions that could 
easily have been replaced with alternatives that are just as reasonable. I propose such 
alternatives, form all possible combinations of the six decisions and their alternatives, construct 
96 HML portfolios. Note that I only report the first three principal components, because the other 
principal components account for less than one percent of the variation. 
 








Pre- and Post-Sample Evidence, 1926 to 1963 and 1992 to 2019 
This table reports Fama and MacBeth (1973) regressions of the monthly returns (in percentage) 
of 96 HML portfolios on a constant and a dummy variable that is one for the original HML 
portfolio using out of sample data. The pre-sample is July 1926 to June 1963, and the post-sample 
is January 1992 to December 2019. 
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The construction of the original HML portfolio includes six seemingly innocuous decisions that 
could easily have been replaced with alternatives that are just as reasonable. I propose such 
alternatives, form all possible combinations of the six decisions and their alternatives, and 
construct 96 HML portfolios. Note that columns (2,5) suppress the constant in the regression. 
t-statistics are reported in parentheses. White (2000) Reality Check Bootstrap p-values are 
reported in square brackets. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Sample July 1926 to June 1963 January 1992 to December 2019 
       
Constant 0.33  0.33 0.14  0.14 
 (1.45)  (1.45) (0.75)  (0.75) 
Original HML Dummy  0.41 0.08  0.20 0.06 
  (1.99) (1.48)  (1.16) (0.84) 
       






Individual Decisions, 1963 to 1991 
This table reports Fama and MacBeth (1973) regressions of the monthly returns (in percent) of 
96 HML portfolios on a constant and six dummy variables for each of the six decisions of the 
original HML portfolio from July 1963 to December 1991. The construction of the original HML 
portfolio includes six seemingly innocuous decisions that could easily have been replaced with 
alternatives that are just as reasonable. I propose such alternatives, form all possible 
combinations of the six decisions and their alternatives, and construct 96 HML portfolios. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
                
Constant 0.26 0.21 0.27 0.26 0.26 0.24 0.18 
 (1.79) (1.28) (1.80) (1.74) (1.77) (1.62) (1.09) 
Dummy for Timing of BE 0.00      0.00 
 (0.28)      (0.28) 
Dummy for Timing of ME  0.11     0.11 
  (1.50)     (1.50) 
Dummy for Neg. BE   -0.00    -0.00 
   (-0.66)    (-0.66) 
Dummy for Financials    0.00   0.00 
    (0.17)   (0.17) 
Dummy for BE/ME Breakpoints     0.00  0.00 
     (0.09)  (0.09) 
Dummy for Timing of Size      0.05 0.05 
      (3.35) (3.35) 
        








Robustness to Cross-sectional Slope Estimates, 1963 to 1991 
This table reports Fama and MacBeth (1973) regressions of monthly slope estimates on a 
constant and a dummy variable that is one for the value measure that is consistent with the 
original HML portfolio and zero otherwise. 
 
>?"# = %&'()*') + , ⋅ ./010'*2	456	7899y;< + ="#  
 
The dependent variable, >?"# , is the monthly slope estimates of monthly cross-sectional 
regressions in which one-month ahead returns are regressed on a constant, on the natural 
logarithm of each of 48 value measures, and on the natural logarithm of market equity, excluding 
microcap stocks. Microcap stocks are defined as stocks with end of June market capitalization 
below the 20 percent breakpoint of all stocks trading on the NYSE. Fama (1976) shows that these 
slope coefficients are returns of long-short portfolios with an exposure of one to the value 
measure. I exclude microcaps as a simple way to account for the equal and value weighting of 
stocks that is used in the construction of the original HML portfolio. I have 48 value measures 
(instead of 96 HML portfolios) because the fifth decision about the breakpoints to sort stocks into 
value and growth portfolios is not applicable here. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) 
        
Constant 0.18  0.18 
 (1.94)  (1.91) 
Original HML Dummy  0.26 0.08 
  (2.83) (3.68) 
    








Full Sample Evidence, 1926 to 2019 
This table reports Fama and MacBeth (1973) regressions of the monthly returns (in percentage) 
of 96 HML portfolios on a constant and on a dummy variable that is one for the original HML 
portfolio, from July 1926 to December 2019.  
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The construction of the original HML portfolio (Fama and French, 1993) includes six seemingly 
innocuous decisions that could easily have been replaced with alternatives that are just as 
reasonable. I propose such alternatives, form all possible combinations of the six decisions and 
their alternatives, and construct 96 HML portfolios. Note that column (2) suppresses the constant 
in the regression. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. White (2000) Reality Check Bootstrap 
p-values are reported in square brackets. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
        
Constant 0.25  0.25 
 (2.21)  (2.21) 
Original HML Dummy  0.33 0.08 
  (3.13) (2.27) 
    






Spanning Regressions, 1927 to 2019 
This table reports spanning regressions of the original and the average HML portfolios using the approach in Barillas 
and Shanken (2017) and the factors in Fama and French (2015) augmented with momentum over different time periods 
from January 1927 to December 2019. The construction of the original HML portfolio includes six seemingly innocuous 
decisions that could easily have been replaced with alternatives that are just as reasonable. I propose such alternatives, 
form all possible combinations of the six decisions and their alternatives, construct 96 HML portfolios, and finally 
collapse the 96 HML portfolios in each month into an average HML portfolio (“AHML”). The factor returns are from 
Kenneth French’s webpage. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
           
Sample 1927 to 1963 1963 to 1991 1992 to 2019 1927 to 2019 1963 to 2019 
Portfolio AHML HML AHML HML AHML HML AHML HML AHML HML 
           
Constant 0.41 0.38 0.32 0.24 -0.06 -0.14 0.52 0.47 0.12 0.04 
 (2.21) (2.02) (3.12) (2.35) (-0.55) (-1.13) (4.92) (4.17) (1.61) (0.47) 
Mkt-RF 0.20 0.20 -0.09 -0.06 0.03 0.07 0.03 0.05 -0.04 0.00 
 (4.86) (4.90) (-3.10) (-2.07) (0.75) (1.74) (1.03) (1.54) (-1.48) (-0.09) 
SMB 0.23 0.23 0.05 0.03 -0.04 -0.06 0.04 0.02 -0.02 -0.04 
 (3.14) (2.85) (1.21) (0.65) (-0.91) (-1.44) (0.52) (0.33) (-0.54) (-1.05) 
CMA   0.76 0.77 0.87 0.92   0.95 0.99 
   (11.36) (10.85) (14.70) (13.30)   (21.85) (20.83) 
RMW   -0.34 -0.33 0.37 0.38   0.19 0.20 
   (-4.74) (-4.34) (6.13) (5.69)   (3.03) (3.25) 
UMD -0.44 -0.30 -0.23 -0.05 -0.34 -0.12 -0.45 -0.28 -0.32 -0.12 
 (-6.20) (-3.82) (-5.58) (-1.42) (-13.02) (-4.73) (-8.89) (-4.81) (-12.08) (-4.81) 
           





Appendix - Table I 
Replication Methodology, 1963 to 1991 
This table compares the summary statistics of the reported and the replicated HML portfolios. 
Column (1) reports summary statistics of the HML portfolio as reported in Fama and French 
(1993, p. 13, Table 2). Column (2) reports the summary statistics of the replicated HML portfolio. 
Column (3) reports the summary statistics of the replicated HML portfolio, but uses the book 
equity definition, as in Davis, Fama, and French (2000). The sample goes from July 1963 to 
December 1991. Note: Fama and French (1993) define book common equity as stockholder 
equity (seq), plus balance-sheet deferred taxes and investment tax credit (txditc) if available, 
minus the book value of preferred stock. The value of preferred stock is the redemption (pstkrv), 
liquidation (pstkl), or par value (pstk), if available, in that order. Davis, Fama, and French (2000) 
define book equity as stockholder book equity plus balance sheet deferred taxes and investment 
tax credit (txditc), if available, minus the book value of preferred stock. Stockholder equity is the 
value reported by Compustat (seq). If not available, stockholders' equity is measured as the book 
value of common equity (ceq) plus the par value of preferred stock (pstk), or the book value of 
assets minus total liabilities (at-lt), in that order. The book value of preferred stock is measured 
as redemption (pstkrv), liquidation (pstkl), or par value (pstk), if available and in that order, for 
the book value of preferred stock. 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Methodology Original HML 
portfolio as Reported 
in Fama and French 
(1993, p. 13, Table 2) 
Replication of the 
original HML 
portfolio as in Fama 
and French (1993) 
Replication of the original 
HML portfolio, but using 
the book equity definition 
as in Davis, Fama, and 
French (2000) 
Mean 0.40 0.35 0.39 
St. Dev. 2.54 2.56 2.53 
t-statistic 2.91 2.52 2.86 
Autocorr. Lag 1 0.18 0.17 0.17 
Autocorr. Lag 2 0.06 0.03 0.04 
Autocorr. Lag 12 0.07 0.08 0.09 
Corr. with SMB -0.08 -0.10 -0.11 
Corr. with MKTRF -0.38 -0.36 -0.37 




Appendix - Table II 
Robustness Test for Seemingly Innocuous Variation in the  
Construction of the Original HML Portfolio, 1963 to 1991 
This table reports Fama and MacBeth (1973) regressions of the monthly returns (in percentage) 
of 96 HML portfolios on a constant and on a dummy variable that is one for the original HML 
portfolio from July 1963 to December 1991. The construction of the original HML portfolio 
includes six seemingly innocuous decisions that could easily have been replaced with alternatives 
that are just as reasonable. I propose such alternatives, form all possible combinations of the six 
decisions and their alternatives, and construct 96 HML portfolios.  
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I define book equity as in Davis, Fama, and French (2000) as stockholders' book equity plus 
balance sheet deferred taxes and investment tax credit (if available) minus the book value of 
preferred stock. Stockholder equity is the value reported by Compustat. If not available, 
stockholder equity is measured as the book value of common equity plus the par value of 
preferred stock, or the book value of assets minus total liabilities (in that order). The book value 
of preferred stock is measured as redemption, liquidation, or par value (if available, in that order). 
Note that column (2) suppresses the constant in the regression. t-statistics are reported in 
parentheses. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) 
        
Constant 0.30  0.30 
 (2.07)  (2.07) 
Original HML Dummy  0.39 0.09 
  (2.87) (1.97) 
    








Appendix - Table III 
Robustness Test for Post-Sample Evidence, 1992 to 2019 
This table reports Fama and MacBeth (1973) regressions of the monthly returns (in percentage) 
of 96 HML portfolios on a constant and on a dummy variable that is one for the original HML 
portfolio from January 1992 to December 2019. The construction of the original HML portfolio 
includes six seemingly innocuous decisions that could easily have been replaced with alternatives 
that are just as reasonable. I propose such alternatives, form all possible combinations of the six 
decisions and their alternatives, and construct 96 HML portfolios.  
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I define book equity as in Davis, Fama, and French (2000) as stockholders' book equity plus 
balance sheet deferred taxes and investment tax credit (if available) minus the book value of 
preferred stock. Stockholder equity is the value reported by Compustat. If not available, 
stockholder equity is measured as the book value of common equity plus the par value of 
preferred stock, or the book value of assets minus total liabilities (in that order). The book value 
of preferred stock is measured as redemption, liquidation, or par value (if available, in that order). 




  (1) (2) (3) 
        
Sample January 1992 to December 2019 
    
Constant 0.13  0.13 
 (0.75)  (0.75) 
Original HML Dummy  0.20 0.06 
  (1.16) (0.84) 
    





Chapter 2: Intangible Assets and Growth Opportunities for Book-to-
Market Equity as a Measure of Value  
 
1. Introduction 
Fama and French (1992, 1993) report that stocks with high book-to-market equity (value stocks) 
on average have higher returns than stocks with low book-to-market equity (growth stocks). One 
issue with book-to-market equity as a measure of value is that book equity does not account for 
intangible assets and growth opportunities because of US GAAP’s conservative accounting 
principle. I therefore propose an estimate for intangible assets and growth opportunities and 
examine if this estimate improves book-to-market equity as a measure of value. 
 I estimate a firm’s intangible assets and growth opportunities as the average difference of 
market equity minus book equity averaged over the previous five years. This estimate relies on 
one of the fundamental roles of financial markets: to aggregate information into prices. If 
markets are efficiently pricing information about intangible assets and growth opportunities, the 
difference of market equity minus book equity averaged over the previous five years serves as 
an estimate of the value of intangible assets and growth opportunities. I take an average over 
five years to smooth out some of the noise that is inherent in the financial market data. 
 The main advantage of this estimate is that it accounts for a broader set of intangible assets 
and for growth opportunities compared to existing estimates, and therefore this estimate should 
improve book-to-market equity as a measure of value. Eisfeldt, Kim, and Papanikolaou (2020), 
Park (2019), and Enache and Srivastava (2018), for example, estimate intangible assets by 
capitalizing SG&A and R&D expenditures. Their estimates account for a firm’s organizational and 
knowledge capital, but they do not account for many intangible assets such as Warren Buffett’s 
management integrity and intellect as CEO of Berkshire Hathaway, Pfizer’s patent to manufacture 
and distribute the blockbuster drug Lipitor, Facebook’s user data that allows them to run targeted 
ads, etc. Additionally, their estimates do not account for growth opportunities. 
 The main disadvantage of my estimate is its reliance on the financial market’s ability to 
efficiently price information about intangible assets and growth opportunities. If investors are 
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irrationally exuberant about intangible assets and growth opportunities, then the estimate 
reflects an upward biased value of intangible assets and growth opportunities and may therefore 
not help improve book-to-market equity as a measure of value. Lakonishok, Shleifer, and 
Vishny (1994), for example, argue that investors are excessively optimistic about growth stocks 
because investors wrongly extrapolate the past growth of growth stocks into the future. 
 I start the empirical analysis by comparing the magnitude of the estimates for intangible 
assets and growth opportunities, organizational and knowledge capital, and book equity. The 
average firm has intangible assets and growth opportunities of 1.78 billion dollars, organizational 
and knowledge capital of 0.8 billion dollars, and book equity of 1.12 billion dollars averaged over 
the years between 1976 and 2019. (The sample starts in 1976 because the estimate for 
organizational and knowledge capital is not available before FASB No. 2 was issued in 1975.) The 
findings suggest that intangible assets and growth opportunities are economically important and 
should thus be accounted for in measures for value. This is consistent with Eisfeldt, Kim, and 
Papanikolaou (2020), Park (2019), and Enache and Srivastava (2018), all of whom add an estimate 
for organizational and knowledge capital to the nominator of book-to-market equity to improve 
book-to-market equity as a measure of value. Additionally, the findings suggest that intangible 
assets and growth opportunities are about twice as large as organizational and knowledge 
capital. This suggests either that intangible assets and growth opportunities are economically 
important and should be accounted for in measures of value, or it suggests that investors are 
valuing intangible assets and growth opportunities overly optimistically and thus that such 
adjustments may not help improve book-to-market equity as a measure of value. 
 Do intangible assets and growth opportunities improve book-to-market equity as a measure 
of value? Empirically, book-to-market equity sorted quintile portfolios have a return spread of 
0.17% per month (t-statistic 1.08) from July 1976 to December 2019. Adding intangible assets 
and growth opportunities to the nominator of book-to-market equity results in an economically 
smaller and statistically less significant quintile spread of 0.07% per month (t-statistic 0.36). This 
suggests therefore that intangible assets and growth opportunities do not improve book-to-
market equity as a measure of value because they are overvalued. 
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 Fama and MacBeth (1973) regression results are consistent with the results from the portfolio 
sorts. The slope estimate on the natural logarithm of book-to-market equity is 0.16 (t-statistic 
2.34) using data from July 1976 to December 2019. Adding intangible assets and growth 
opportunities to the nominator of the natural logarithm of book-to-market equity leads to a 
somewhat larger slope estimate of 0.21 and a smaller t-statistic of 1.67. The slope estimate is 
somewhat larger because the adjusted variable has a smaller standard deviation than book-to-
market equity. 
 The regression results are similar when the sample is restricted to larger stocks for which 
more information is available and for which arbitrage costs are lower. The findings suggest 
therefore that the investors are not only overvaluing intangible assets and growth opportunities 
of microcap stocks, but also of larger stocks. 
 In the last empirical test, I study if the ratio of intangible assets and growth opportunities to 
market equity predicts returns negatively. A negative effect is consistent with the correction of 
the overvaluation of intangible assets and growth opportunities. Empirically, portfolios sorted on 
the ratio of intangible assets and growth opportunities to market equity have a quintile spread 
of -0.26% per month with a t-statistic of -1.91. The quintile spread has a Fama and French (1993) 
three-factor model of 0.01% per month with a t-statistic of 0.10. This may alternatively suggest 
that intangible assets and growth opportunities have lower returns because they are more 




I use data from the intersection of CRSP and Compustat. The sample is restricted to common 
ordinary US stocks (share code 10 or 11) that are trading on the NYSE, the NASDAQ, and the Amex 
(exchange code 1, 2, or 3).  
 I estimate intangible assets and growth opportunities once a year at the end of June as the 
difference between the market equity and book equity of each firm averaged over its previous 
five years. To be consistent with Fama and French (1992, 1993), market equity is price times share 
outstanding at the end of December of the previous year and book equity is shareholders’ equity 
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of the firm’s last fiscal year available at the end of December of the previous year. This can be 









 Accordingly, book equity is defined as stockholders’ equity (seq), plus balance sheet deferred 
taxes and investment tax credit (txditc) if available, minus the book value of preferred stock. The 
book value of preferred stock is the redemption (pstkrv), liquidation (pstkl), or par value (pstk), 
if available, in that order. I require non-missing book equity and market equity in the previous 
five years in order to estimate intangible assets and growth opportunities. 
 Additionally, I use data on organizational and knowledge capital available on WRDS. 
Organizational capital is calculated as in Eisfeldt and Papanikolaou (2013), using the perpetual 
inventory method specified as 𝑂"$ = 	0.3 ⋅ 𝑆𝐺&𝐴"$ + 0.8 ⋅ 𝑂"$1> and an initial value of three 
times 𝑆𝐺&𝐴. Knowledge capital is calculated as in Peters and Taylor (2017), using the perpetual 
inventory method specified as 𝐾"$ = 	𝑅&𝐷"$ + 𝛿 ⋅ 𝐾"$1> with industry-specific depreciation rates. 
Organizational and knowledge capital require non-missing and non-negative book equity and 
revenue, firms with more than 5 million dollars in property, plant and equipment, and are 
available after FASB No 2 was issued in 1975. Organizational and knowledge capital are not 
available for financial firms (first digit sic of 6), regulated industries (first two digits sic of 49), and 
public service firms (first digit sic of 9). 
 Also, I use the monthly factor returns of the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model from 
Kenneth French’s webpage. 
 
3. Summary Statistics 
Table I reports summary statistics for the average firm from July 1976 to December 2019. Panel 
A estimates that the average firm has intangible assets and growth opportunities of 1.78 billion 
dollars, organizational and knowledge capital of 0.80 billion dollars, and book equity of 1.18 





 The finding that the estimated intangible assets and growth opportunities, as well as the 
estimated organization and knowledge capital, are as large or larger than book equity is 
consistent with the view that book equity does not account for a large amount of non-capitalized 
assets because of US GAAP’s conservative accounting principle and that they are important in 
constructing a measure of value. 
 The finding that the estimate for intangible assets and growth opportunities is twice as large 
as the estimate for organization and knowledge capital is on the one hand consistent with the 
view of a broader estimate for intangible assets and of an estimate that includes growth 
opportunities, and on the other hand consistent with the view that investors are overvaluing 
intangible assets and growth opportunities. 
 Panels B and C report summary statistics and correlations of the natural logarithms of book-
to-market equity, book equity plus intangible assets and growth opportunities to market equity, 
and book equity plus organizational and knowledge capital to market equity. The three value 
measures have pairwise correlations of 0.69, 0.79, and 0.69. This suggests that they share a large 
amount of common variation with book-to-market equity and that they also bring new variation 
to book-to-market equity. 
 
 
4. Empirical Tests 
 
Portfolio Sorts 
Table II reports the average returns of portfolios sorted on the three value measures from July 
1976 to December 2019. The portfolios are formed once a year at the end of June and are value-






 Panel A reports the average returns of portfolios sorted on book-to-market equity. The 
portfolio with the lowest quintile of book-to-market equity has an average return of 0.95% per 
month, and the portfolio with the highest quintile of book-to-market equity has an average 
return of 1.13% per month. The quintile spread is 0.17% per month with a t-statistic of 1.08. 
These findings are consistent with Fama and French (1992, 1993) and Davis, Fama, and French 
(2000) who report that stocks with high book-to-market equity on average have higher returns 
in the US equity market.  
 The quintile spread of 0.17% per month is economically smaller and statistically less 
significant than reported in the above-mentioned studies. This is not a result of my sampling 
procedure, which excludes firms with missing book equity and market equity in the previous five 
years. Instead, the smaller quintile spread is a result of the more recent sample that starts in July 
1976. The smaller quintile spread is therefore consistent with Fama and French’s (2020) 
argument that the value premium is smaller because of the large amount of noise in monthly 
returns, and it is consistent with McLean and Pontiff’s (2016) argument that the average anomaly 
portfolio return is smaller post-publication because of sophisticated investors’ arbitrage activity. 
 Panel B reports the average returns of portfolios sorted on book equity plus the estimated 
value of intangible assets and growth opportunities to market equity. The portfolio with the 
lowest quintile has an average return of 1.07% per month, and the portfolio with the highest 
quintile has an average return of 1.14% per month. The quintile spread is 0.07% per month with 
a t-statistic of 0.36. The smaller quintile spread therefore suggests that adding the estimate for 
intangible assets and growth opportunities to the nominator of book-to-market equity does not 
improve book-to-market equity as a measure of value because the estimate reflects an overly 
optimistic valuation of intangible assets and growth opportunities. 
 Panel C reports the average returns of portfolios sorted on book equity plus the estimated 
value of organizational and knowledge capital to market equity. The portfolio with the lowest 
quintile has an average return of 0.96% per month, and the portfolio with the highest quintile 
has an average return of 1.30% per month. The quintile spread is 0.34% per month with a 
t-statistic of 1.98. The larger quintile spread suggests that adding organizational and knowledge 
capital to the nominator of book-to-market equity improves book-to-market equity as a measure 
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of value, as already documented in Eisfeldt, Kim, and Papanikolaou (2020), Park (2019), and 
Enache and Srivastava (2018). 
 
Cross-Sectional Regressions 
Table III reports Fama and MacBeth (1973) regression results in which I regress monthly returns 
on each of the value measures from July 1976 to December 2019. I include the natural logarithm 
of market equity at the end of June as a right-hand side variable to account for the size effect. All 




 Column (1) reports a slope estimate of 0.16 with a t-statistic of 2.34 for the natural logarithm 
of book-to-market equity. Column (2) reports that adding the estimate for intangible assets and 
growth opportunities to the nominator of the natural logarithm of book-to-market equity results 
in a slope estimate of 0.21 with a t-statistic of 1.67. The slope estimate is somewhat larger but 
statistically less significant. The economic magnitude of a one standard deviation change is the 
same, however, because book-to-market equity has a somewhat larger standard deviation 
(0.16*0.71=0.11 versus 0.21*0.50=0.11). The findings therefore suggest that adding the estimate 
for intangible assets and growth opportunities to the nominator of book-to-market equity does 
not improve book-to-market equity as a measure of value because the estimate reflects an overly 
optimistic valuation of intangible assets and growth opportunities. 
 Column (3) reports that adding organizational and knowledge capital to the nominator of 
book-to-market equity leads to a slope estimate of 0.28 with a t-statistic of 3.91. The slope 
estimate is economically larger and statistically more significant. Adding organizational and 
knowledge capital to the nominator of book-to-market equity therefore improves book-to-
market equity as a measure of value as reported in Eisfeldt, Kim, and Papanikolaou (2020), Park 
(2019), and Enache and Srivastava (2018). Additionally, columns (4) to (6) report that book equity 
plus organizational and knowledge capital to market equity explains most of the stock return 






Table IV estimates the same regression specifications as before but excludes microcap stocks, 
which are defined as stocks with market equity smaller than the 20th percentile of market equity 
of all stocks trading on the NYSE according to Fama and French (2008). The overly optimistic 
valuation of intangible assets and growth opportunities may only be a result of microcap stocks 




 The estimation results for non-microcap stocks in Table IV are similar to the estimation results 
for all stocks in Table III. The findings therefore suggest that, even for larger stocks, adding the 
estimate for intangible assets and growth opportunities to the nominator of book-to-market 
equity does not improve book-to-market as a measure of value because intangible assets and 
growth opportunities are overvalued. 
 
Reversal and Momentum Effects 
Reversal and momentum effects may explain why adding intangible assets and growth 
opportunities to book-to-market equity results in a smaller value effect, because intangible 
assets and growth opportunities are estimated for each firm over the firm’s previous five years. 
I define short-term reversal as the return in month t as in Jegadeesh (1990), momentum as the 
cumulative monthly return from t-12 to t-2 as in Jegadeesh and Titman (1993), and long-term 
reversal as the cumulative monthly return from t-60 to t-2 as in DeBondt and Thaler (1985). 
 Table V reports Fama and MacBeth (1973) regression results in which I regress monthly 
returns on book equity plus the estimate for intangible assets and growth opportunities to 





 Column (1) reports a slope estimate on book equity plus intangible assets and growth 
opportunities of 0.21 with a t-statistic of 1.67. Column (2) reports an unchanged slope estimate 
of 0.20 with a t-statistic of 1.66 conditional on the short-term reversal effect. Column (3) reports 
a larger slope estimate of 0.28 with a t-statistic of 2.36 conditional on momentum. This is 
consistent with Asness (1997) and Asness, Moskowitz, and Pedersen (2013), who report a 
negative correlation between book-to-market equity and momentum. Column (4) reports a 
smaller slope estimate of 0.10 with a t-statistic of 0.75 conditional on the long-term reversal 
effect. This is consistent with Gerakos and Linnainmaa’s (2018) argument that the value effect is 
a result of changes in market equity. 
 Overall, the empirical findings do not suggest that reversal and momentum effects explain 
why adding intangible assets and growth opportunities to book-to-market equity results in a 
smaller value effect. 
 
Share Issuance Effects 
Share issuance effects may explain why adding intangible assets and growth opportunities to 
book-to-market equity results in a smaller value effect, because intangible assets and growth 
opportunities are estimated for each firm over the firm’s previous five years.  
 Table VI reports Fama and MacBeth (1973) regression results in which I regress monthly 
returns on book equity plus the estimate for intangible assets and growth opportunities to 
market equity conditional on share issuance effects from July 1976 to December 2019. I define 




 Column (1) reports a slope estimate on book equity plus intangible assets and growth 
opportunities of 0.20 with a t-statistic of 1.60. Column (2) reports a somewhat smaller slope 
estimate of 0.16 with a t-statistic of 1.25 conditional on share issuance from t-17 to t-6. Column 
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(3) also reports a somewhat smaller slope estimate of 0.17 with a t-statistic of 1.36 conditional 
on share issuance from t-65 to t-6. Column (4) reports a slope estimate of 0.16 with a t-statistic 
of 1.27 conditional on both share issuance variables. 
 Overall, the empirical findings do not suggest that share issuance effects explain why adding 




5. Are Intangible Assets and Growth Opportunities Overvalued? 
If the estimate for intangible assets and growth opportunities reflects an overly optimistic 
valuation, then the correction of the overvaluation should predict returns negatively. 
 Table VII reports monthly returns of portfolios sorted on the difference between the two 






	, from July 1976 to 
December 2019. Portfolios are formed once a year at the end of June and are value-weighted, 
with breakpoints based on stocks trading on the NYSE. 
 Panel A reports that the portfolio with the low difference has an average return of 1.24% per 
month, and that the portfolio with the high difference has an average return of 0.97% per month. 
The quintile spread is -0.26 with a t-statistic of -1.91. These empirical findings are consistent with 
the behavioral view that investors price intangible assets and growth opportunities in an overly 
optimistic way. 
 Panel B reports monthly returns in excess of the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model. 
The alpha of the portfolio with the low difference has an average return of 0.38% per month, and 
the alpha of the portfolio with the high difference has an average return of 0.39% per month. 
The quintile spread is 0.01 with a t-statistic of 0.10. This empirical finding suggests that the overly 
optimistic valuation of intangible assets and growth opportunities may not reflect overvaluation 






One concern with book-to-market equity as a measure of value is that book equity does not 
account for intangible assets and growth opportunities because of US GAAP’s conservative 
accounting principle. I therefore propose an estimate for intangible assets and growth 
opportunities and examine if that estimate improves book-to-market equity as a measure of 
value. 
 I estimate a firm’s intangible assets and growth opportunities as the average difference 
between market equity and book equity averaged over the previous five years. This estimate 
rests on one of the central roles of financial markets: to aggregate information into prices. If 
markets are efficiently pricing information about intangible assets and growth opportunities, the 
difference of market equity minus book equity averaged over the previous five years serves as 
an estimate for the value of intangible assets and growth opportunities. I take an average over 
five years to smooth out some of the noise that is inherent in the financial market data. 
 The main advantage over existing estimates for intangible assets, such as those by Eisfeldt, 
Kim, and Papanikolaou (2020), Park (2019), and Enache and Srivastava (2018), is that the 
estimate reflects a broader set of intangible assets and growth opportunities because prices in 
efficient markets incorporate information about firms’ intangible asset and growth 
opportunities. The main disadvantage over existing estimates, however, is that the estimate 
relies on efficient markets. If markets are not fully efficient and investors value intangible assets 
and growth opportunities in an irrationally exuberant way, such as in Lakonishok, Shleifer, and 
Vishny (1994), the estimate will reflect a biased estimate of the value of intangible assets and 
growth opportunities. 
 Do intangible assets and growth opportunities improve book-to-market equity as a measure 
of value? My empirical findings overall suggest that they don’t result in a better measure of value, 
because investors overvalue intangible assets and growth opportunities. Portfolios sorted on the 
adjusted book-to-market equity measure have lower return spreads than portfolios sorted on 
book-to-market equity using data from July 1976 to December 2019. The Fama and 
MacBeth (1973) slope estimate of the logarithm of the adjusted book-to-market equity variable 
 59 
is about as large as the slope estimate of the logarithm of book-to-market equity. The results are 
similar for larger stocks for which more information is available and for which arbitrage costs are 
lower. The lower returns of the adjusted book-to-market equity variable are also not a result of 
return reversal effects, nor are they a result of share issuance effects. 
 Do investors overvalue intangible assets and growth opportunities? Consistent with 
correction of overvaluation, I find that the difference between the book-to-market equity 
variable adjusted for intangible assets and growth opportunities and the book-to-market equity 
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Summary Statistics, 1976–2019 
This table reports summary statistics for the estimates of intangible assets and growth 
opportunities (I+G), organizational and knowledge capital (O+K), book equity (B), and market 
equity (M) from July 1976 to December 2019. The summary statistics are time-series averages of 
annual cross-sectional means, standard deviations, and correlations. Intangible assets and 
growth opportunities are estimated as the average difference of market equity minus book 
equity averaged over a firm’s previous five years. Formally, (𝐼",$ + 𝐺",$) = 	
>
J
⋅ ∑ (𝑀",- − 𝐵",-$-0$12 ). 
Organizational and knowledge capital are estimated using the perpetual inventory model applied 
to a firm’s research and development spending (R&D) and a fraction of selling, general and 
administrative spending (SG&A), as in Peters and Taylor (2017). Book equity and market equity 
are defined as in Davis, Fama, and French (2000). 
 
Panel A: Assets (in millions of dollars) 
 Mean St. Deviation 
Intangible Assets and Growth 
Opportunities (I+G) 1,679.60 4,927.73 
Organizational and Knowledge 
Capital (O+K) 806.10 2,211.50 
Book Equity (B) 1,180.61 3,212.82 
Market Equity (M) 4,102.82 15,303.35 
 
Panel B: Value Measures 
  Mean St. Deviation 
ln(B/M) -0.69 0.71 
ln((B+I)/M) -0.01 0.50 
Ln((B+O+K)/M) -0.09 0.71 
ln(M) 6.07 1.82 
 
Panel C: Correlation of Value Measures 
 ln(B/M) ln((B+I)/M) Ln((B+O+K)/M) ln(M) 
ln(B/M) 1.00    
ln((B+I+G)/M) 0.67 1.00   
Ln((B+O+K)/M) 0.79 0.67 1.00  
ln(M) -0.36 -0.33 -0.45 1.00 
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Table II 
Portfolio Sorts, 1976–2019 
This table reports monthly returns of portfolios sorted on book-to-market equity, book equity 
plus intangible assets to market equity, and book equity plus knowledge and organizational 
capital to market equity from July 1976 to December 2019. Portfolios are value-weighted and 
based on NYSE breakpoints. Intangible assets and growth opportunities are estimated as the 
average difference of market equity minus book equity averaged over a firm’s previous five years. 
Formally, (𝐼",$ + 𝐺",$) = 	
>
J
⋅ ∑ (𝑀",- − 𝐵",-$-0$12 ). Organizational and knowledge capital are estimated 
using the perpetual inventory model applied to a firm’s past research and development spending 
(R&D) and a fraction of past selling, general and administrative spending (SG&A), as in Peters and 
Taylor (2017). Book equity and market equity are defined as in Davis, Fama, and French (2000). 
t-statistics are shown in parenthesis.  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (5)-(1)  
Panel A: Sorted on (B/M) 
Mean 0.95 1.08 1.04 1.12 1.13 0.17 
t-statistic (4.59) (5.479 (5.08) (5.35) (4.84) (1.08) 
       
Panel B: Sorted on (B+I+G)/M     
Mean 1.07 0.98 1.07 1.11 1.14 0.07 
t-statistic (4.46) (4.93) (5.63) (5.65) (4.66) (0.36) 
       
Panel C: Sorted on (B+O+K)/M 
Mean 0.96 0.99 1.12 1.19 1.30 0.34 




Fama and MacBeth Regressions, 1976–2019 
This table reports results of Fama and MacBeth (1973) regressions in which one-month ahead 
returns are regressed on a constant, the natural logarithms of book-to-market equity, book 
equity plus intangible assets and growth opportunities to market equity, and book equity plus 
organizational and knowledge capital to market equity from July 1976 to December 2019. 
Intangible assets and growth opportunities are estimated as the average difference of market 




∑ (𝑀",- − 𝐵",-$-0$12 ). Organizational and knowledge capital are estimated using the perpetual 
inventory model applied to a firm’s past research and development spending (R&D) and a 
fraction of past selling, general and administrative spending (SG&A), as in Peters and Taylor 
(2017). Book equity and market equity are defined as in Davis, Fama, and French (2000). 
t-statistics are shown in parenthesis. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
ln(B/M) 0.16   0.12 -0.15  
 (2.34)   (1.52) (-1.59)  
ln((B+I+G)/M)  0.21  0.10  -0.03 
  (1.67)  (0.65)  (-0.24) 
ln((B+O+K)/M)   0.28  0.40 0.26 
   (3.91)  (4.01) (3.63) 
ln(M) -0.05 -0.05 -0.02 -0.05 -0.02 -0.03 
 (-1.36) (-1.38) (-0.63) (-1.35) (-0.64) (-0.78) 
Constant 1.62 1.47 1.36 1.52 1.27 1.35 
 (4.30) (4.10) (3.74) (4.31) (3.55) (3.74) 
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Table IV 
Non-Microcap Stocks, 1976–2019 
This table reports Fama and MacBeth (1973) regressions of one-month ahead returns on a 
constant, on the natural logarithms of book-to-market equity, book equity plus intangible assets 
to market equity, and book equity plus organizational and knowledge capital to market equity 
for non-microcap stocks (with market equity below the 20th percentile of market equity of NYSE 
traded stocks) from July 1976 to December 2019. Intangible assets and growth opportunities are 
estimated as the average difference of market equity minus book equity averaged over a firm’s 
previous five years. Formally, (𝐼",$ + 𝐺",$) = 	
>
J
⋅ ∑ (𝑀",- − 𝐵",-$-0$12 ). Organizational and knowledge 
capital are estimated using the perpetual inventory model applied to a firm’s past research and 
development spending (R&D) and a fraction of past selling, general and administrative spending 
(SG&A), as in Peters and Taylor (2017). Book equity and market equity are defined as in Davis, 
Fama, and French (2000). t-statistics are shown in parenthesis. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
ln(B/M) 0.10   0.08 -0.22  
 (1.33)   (1.03) (-2.02)  
ln((B+I+G)/M)  0.10  0.04  -0.11 
  (0.68)  (0.25)  (-0.71) 
ln((B+O+K)/M)   0.19  0.38 0.20 
   (2.52)  (3.48) (2.79) 
ln(M) -0.06 -0.06 -0.05 -0.06 -0.05 -0.05 
 (-1.58) (-1.53) (-1.28) (-1.52) (-1.36) (-1.30) 
Constant 1.66 1.57 1.55 1.61 1.61 1.52 
 (3.76) (3.57) (3.52) (3.65) (3.65) (3.45) 
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Table V 
Return Reversal and Momentum Effects, 1976–2019 
This table reports Fama and MacBeth (1973) regressions of one-month ahead returns on a 
constant, on the natural logarithm of book equity plus intangible assets and growth opportunities 
to market equity, short-term reversal, momentum, and long-term reversal from July 1976 to 
December 2019. Intangible assets and growth opportunities are estimated as the average 
difference of market equity minus book equity averaged over a firm’s previous five years. 
Formally, (𝐼",$ + 𝐺",$) = 	
>
J
⋅ ∑ (𝑀",- − 𝐵",-$-0$12 ). Organizational and knowledge capital are estimated 
using the perpetual inventory model applied to a firm’s past research and development spending 
(R&D) and a fraction of past selling, general and administrative spending (SG&A), as in Peters and 
Taylor (2017). Book equity and market equity are defined as in Davis, Fama, and French (2000). 
Short-term reversal is the one-month return in the previous month, as in Jegadeesh (1990); 
momentum is the cumulative monthly return from t-12 to t-2, as in Jegadeesh and Titman (1993); 
and long-term reversal is the cumulative monthly return from t-59 to t-13, as in DeBondt and 
Thaler (1985). t-statistics are shown in parenthesis. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
       
ln((B+I+G)/M) 0.21 0.20 0.28 0.10 0.20 
 (1.67) (1.66) (2.36) (0.75) (1.63) 
Short-term Reversal  -3.90   -4.84 
  (-8.62)   (-11.76) 
Momentum   0.22  0.60 
   (1.18)  (3.34) 
Long-term Reversal    -0.06 -0.05 
    (-1.99) (-1.98) 
ln(M) -0.05 -0.04 -0.05 -0.05 -0.06 
 (-1.42) (-1.22) (-1.61) (-1.44) (-1.72) 
Constant 1.48 1.45 1.37 1.52 1.41 
  (4.12) (4.12) (4.09) (4.31) (4.30) 
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Table VI 
Share Issuance Effects, 1976–2019 
This table reports Fama and MacBeth (1973) regressions of one-month ahead returns on a 
constant, on the natural logarithm of book equity plus intangible assets and growth opportunities 
to market equity, short-term reversal, momentum, and long-term reversal from July 1976 to 
December 2019. Intangible assets and growth opportunities are estimated as the average 
difference of market equity minus book equity averaged over a firm’s previous five years. 
Formally, (𝐼",$ + 𝐺",$) = 	
>
J
⋅ ∑ (𝑀",- − 𝐵",-$-0$12 ). Organizational and knowledge capital are estimated 
using the perpetual inventory model applied to a firm’s past research and development spending 
(R&D) and a fraction of past selling, general and administrative spending (SG&A), as in Peters and 
Taylor (2017). Book equity and market equity are defined as in Davis, Fama, and French (2000). 
Share issuance variables are defined from t-17 to t-6 and from t-65 to t-6, as in Pontiff and 
Woodgate (2008). t-statistics are in parenthesis. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Ln((B+I+G)/M) 0.20 0.16 0.17 0.16 
 (1.60) (1.25) (1.36) (1.27) 
Share Issuancet-17, t-6  -1.38  -0.53 
  (-4.26)  (-1.98) 
Share Issuancet-65, t-6   -0.57 -0.50 
   (-4.45) (-3.87) 
Ln(M) -0.05 -0.06 -0.06 -0.07 
 (-1.40) (-1.74) (-1.97) (-2.01) 
Constant 1.47 1.57 1.66 1.67 






Correction of Mispricing? 1976–2019 
This table reports monthly returns of portfolios sorted on the difference between the natural 
logarithm of book equity plus intangible assets and growth opportunities to market equity minus 
the natural logarithm of book equity plus organizational and knowledge capital to market equity 
from July 1976 to December 2019. Portfolios are value-weighted and based on NYSE breakpoints. 
 
Difference = 	 lnNCDE
G




Intangible assets and growth opportunities are estimated as the average difference of market 




∑ (𝑀",- − 𝐵",-$-0$12 ). Organizational and knowledge capital are estimated using the perpetual 
inventory model applied to a firm’s past research and development spending (R&D) and a 
fraction of past selling, general and administrative spending (SG&A), as in Peters and Taylor 
(2017). Book equity and market equity are defined as in Davis, Fama, and French (2000). The 
monthly factor returns for Mkt-Rf, SMB, and HML are from Kenneth French’s webpage. 
t-statistics are shown in parenthesis. 
 
Panel A: Unconditional Portfolio Returns 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (5)-(1) 
       
Constant 1.24 1.08 1.00 1.09 0.97 -0.26 
 (5.22) (5.04) (4.75) (5.37) (4.81) (-1.91) 
 
 
Panel B: Fama and French (1993) Three-Factor Alpha 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (5)-(1) 
              
Alpha 0.38 0.41 0.40 0.54 0.39 0.01 
 (3.97) (5.26) (5.68) (8.60) (4.64) (0.10) 
Mkt-RF 1.12 1.03 1.00 0.98 0.97 -0.15 
 (49.39) (56.05) (60.22) (66.28) (48.20) (-5.30) 
SMB 0.27 0.08 -0.02 -0.14 -0.16 -0.42 
 (8.10) (2.83) (-0.85) (-6.32) (-5.32) (-10.08) 
HML 0.35 -0.01 -0.16 -0.21 -0.05 -0.41 





Chapter 3: What is the Dominant Value Explanation? 
 
1. Introduction 
What explains the higher returns of stocks with high book-to-market equity over stocks with low 
book-to-market equity (Fama and French, 1992)? The literature puts forward nine explanations: 
Fama and French (1993) argue that value stocks are more exposed to the systematic value factor. 
Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1994) argue that investors wrongly extrapolate the past growth 
of growth stocks and that its correction gives rise to the value effect. Bhandari (1988) argues that 
value stocks have higher financial leverage. Carlson, Fisher and Giammarino (2004), Zhang (2005), 
and Novy-Marx (2011) argue that value stocks have higher operating leverage. Campbell and 
Vuolteenaho (2004) and Da and Warachka (2009) argue that value stocks have higher cashflow 
risk. Parker and Julliard (2005) and Bansal, Dittmar, and Lundblad (2005) argue that value stocks 
have higher consumption risk. Dechow, Sloan, and Soliman (2004) and Da (2009) argue that value 
stocks have higher durations. Daniel and Titman (2006) argue that the value effect is a result of 
investor’s reaction to intangible information. Kogan and Papanikolaou (2014) argue that value 
stocks are less exposed to investment-specific technology shocks. 
 In this paper, I simultaneously study these nine explanations to better understand what the 
dominant explanation of the value effect is. The empirical strategy is a Fama and MacBeth (1973) 
regression in which the expected returns of the value effect are regressed on proxies for the nine 
explanations. If the value effect is the result of one dominant explanation, I expect to find one 
significant slope estimate. If the value effect, however, is the result of multiple explanations (Ball, 
1978; Berk, 1995), I expect to find multiple significant slope estimates. 
 The expected returns of the value effect, which is the left-hand side variable in the main 
regression analysis, have to be estimated in a prior step. I estimate them using monthly cross-
sectional regressions in which monthly stock returns are regressed on the natural logarithm of 
book-to-market equity and on the natural logarithm of market equity. The expected returns of 
the value effect are then defined as the natural logarithm of book-to-market equity times its 
monthly slope estimates. I include the natural logarithm of market equity as a right-hand side 
variable to account for the higher returns of smaller stocks (Banz, 1981; Fama and French, 1992). 
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 The empirical evidence suggests that duration is the dominant explanation of the value effect. 
I find that a one standard deviation in a stock’s duration is associated with expected value returns 
of 0.09% per month. This is more than half of the value effect in my sample. Duration explains 
nearly the entire value effect in the original value study’s sample period, and about half of the 
value effect out-of-sample. The slope estimates of the other proxies are statistically significant, 
but economically negligible relative to the effect of duration. 
 Are these value explanations the result of investor’s rational or irrational expectations? I 
estimate the main regression specification using data from the original study’s sample period and 
using post-publication data. If the value expectations are the result of rational expectations, I 
expect to find similar slope estimate in sample and out of sample. If the value explanations are 
the result of irrational expectations, however, I expect to find slope estimates that are 
significantly smaller out of sample. 
 The empirical evidence suggests that the part of the value effect that is explained by duration 
may be the result of rational or irrational expectations. The in- versus out-of-sample difference 
is large but not statistically significant. The findings are, on one hand, consistent with Fama and 
French’s (2020) argument that the smaller out-of-sample value effect is a result of noise in 
monthly stock returns. The findings are, on the other hand, consistent with McLean and Pontiff’s 
(2020) argument that sophisticated investors learn about mispricing and trade on it. 
 
2. Explanations for the Value Effect 
This section describes the nine explanations of the value effect that are put forward in the 
literature, it defines their proxy variables, and it reports the correlations between the variables. 




 Exposure to the Systematic Value Factor: Fama and French (1993, 1996) argue that value 
stocks have higher returns than growth stocks because value stocks are more exposed to the 
systematic value factor of their three-factor asset pricing model. I measure a stock’s exposure to 
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the systematic value factor as the beta of a stock’s monthly returns with the returns of the HML 
portfolio over the previous five years. 
 Overreaction to Past Growth: Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1994) and La Porta (1996) 
argue that investors wrongly extrapolate the past growth of growth stocks and that its correction 
gives rise to the value effect. I measure sales growth as the average annual growth in sales over 
a firm’s previous five years using the weights 5, 4, 3, 2, and 1 as in Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny 
(1994). 
 Financial Leverage: Value stocks may have higher returns than growth stocks because value 
stocks have higher financial leverage. Fama and French (1992) report that book-to-market equity 
and size absorb the stock return predictability of debt to market equity (Bhandari, 1988), earnings 
to price (Basu, 1977, 1983), and other variables. This suggests therefore that the higher returns 
of value stocks may be the result of financial leverage. Penman, Richardson, and Tuna (2007) 
decompose book-to-market equity into a financial leverage component and an enterprise 
component. They find, however, that financial leverage is negatively related to returns. I measure 
financial leverage as total debt to total assets. 
 Operating Leverage: Carlson, Fisher, and Giammarino (2004), Zhang (2005), and Novy-Marx 
(2011) argue that value stocks have higher returns than growth stocks because value firms have 
higher fixed costs of production that are costlier to adjust in economic downturns. I measure 
operating leverage as cost of goods sold plus selling, general and administrative costs to total 
assets as in Novy-Marx (2011). 
 Reaction to Intangible Information: Daniel and Titman (2006) argue that value stocks have 
higher returns than growth stocks because of investors’ reaction to intangible information that 
is orthogonal to investors’ reaction to tangible information. I measure the reaction to intangible 
information as the residuals of annual cross-sectional regressions in which a stock’s total return 
over the previous five years is regressed on the stock’s book return over the previous five years 
and on share issuance as in Daniel and Titman (2006). 
 Cashflow Risk: Campbell and Vuolteenaho (2004) and Da and Warachka (2009) argue that 
value stocks have higher returns than growth stocks because value stocks have higher cashflow 
risk. I measure cashflow risk as the beta of a stock’s return with cashflow news using the VAR 
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decomposition of returns in Campbell and Vuolteenaho (2004). Specifically, I sort stocks on book-
to-market equity into ten portfolios, calculate the beta of each portfolio’s return with cashflow 
news from the VAR system, and then use the beta of each portfolio for the betas of the stocks in 
that portfolio. 
 Consumption Risk: Parker and Julliard (2005) and Bansal, Dittmar, and Lundblad (2005) argue 
that value stocks have higher returns than growth stocks because value stocks have higher 
consumption risk. I measure consumption risk as the beta of a stock’s return with consumption 
growth over the subsequent three years as in Parker and Julliard (2005). Specifically, I sort stocks 
on book-to-market equity into ten portfolios, calculate the beta of each portfolio’s return with 
consumption growth, and then use the beta of each portfolio for the betas of the stocks in that 
portfolio. 
 Duration Risk: Dechow, Sloan, and Soliman (2004), Lettau and Wachter (2007), and Da (2009) 
argue that value stocks have higher returns than growth stocks because the cashflows of growth 
stocks occur in the more distant future than those of growth stocks, and that long-horizon equity 
is less risky. I measure duration as in Dechow, Sloan, and Soliman (2004). 
 Investment-Specific Technology Shocks: Kogan and Papanikolaou (2014) argue that value 
stocks have higher returns than growth stocks because value stocks are more exposed to 
investment-specific technology stocks that come with a negative risk premium. I measure a firm’s 
exposure to investment-specific technology shocks as the beta of a stock’s returns with the 
returns of the IMC portfolio (a portfolio that goes long investment goods producers and short 
consumer goods producers) as in Kogan and Papanikolaou (2014). Specifically, I sort stocks on 
book-to-market equity into ten portfolios, calculate the beta of each portfolio’s return with the 
IMC portfolio’s returns, and then use the beta of each portfolio for the betas of the stocks in that 
portfolio. 
 
My empirical analysis is based on data from the intersection of CRSP and Compustat. The sample 
is restricted to common ordinary US stocks (share code 10 or 11) that are trading on the NYSE, 
the NASDAQ, and the Amex (exchange code 1, 2, or 3) with non-missing and non-negative book 
equity, non-missing market equity at the end of December of year t-1 and at the end of June of 
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year t, and with at least two years of available Compustat data. The final sample requires non-
missing observations for the nine proxies. All proxies are winsorized at 0.5% and 99.5% in each 
month to mitigate the impact of extreme observations. 
 Table II reports the correlations between the proxies of the value explanations from 1968 to 
2019. The correlations between some variables are low, for example sales growth and financial 
leverage with a correlation of 0.05, and suggest that the value effect may be the result of multiple 
explanations. The correlations of other variables are high, for example cashflow risk and 
consumption risk with a correlation of 0.91, and suggests that the empirical evidence for one 




3. The Expected Returns of the Value Effect 
The expected returns of the value effect, which is the left-hand side variable in the main 
regression analysis, are estimated in a prior step. I estimate them using monthly cross-sectional 
regressions in which monthly stock returns, !"#$%&', are regressed on the natural logarithm of 
book-to-market equity, ln *+,-
.,-
/, and on the natural logarithm of market equity, ln(1$%), as in 
Fama and French (1992). The expected returns of the value effect are then defined as the natural 
logarithm of book-to-market equity times their monthly slope estimates from these regressions. 
Equation (1) shows the regression specification and indicates the term that is used as the 
estimate for the expected return of the value effect in each month t.  
 






+ P6% ⋅ ln(1$%)				    (1) 
 
  I include the natural logarithm of market equity as a right-hand side variable to account for 
the higher returns of smaller stocks (Banz, 1981; Fama and French, 1992). Also, I require non-
missing observations for the nine proxies of the value explanations. The natural logarithm of 
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book-to-market equity and the natural logarithm of market equity are winsorized at 0.5% and 




 Table III reports the estimation results of the Fama and MacBeth (1973) regressions using 
data from the full sample period from July 1968 to December 2019. The sample starts in 1968 
because the first five years are needed for the estimation of the proxy variables (e.g. sales growth 
is measured over five years). 
 Column (1) estimates a value effect of 0.29 (t-statistic 4.13) unconditionally and column (2) 
estimates a value effect of 0.20 (t-statistic 3.12) conditional on size. These estimates are 
somewhat smaller than the ones reported in the literature (Fama and French, 1992) because the 
requirement of non-missing observations for the nine proxies of the value explanations excludes 
many small and young stocks for which the value effect is somewhat stronger (Fama and French, 
2008). Column (3) reports a value effect of 0.31 (t-statistic 3.67) for the in-sample period and 
column (4) reports a value effect of 0.10 (t-statistic 1.05) for the out-of-sample period. These 
findings are consistent with Fama and French (2020).  
 
 
4. What is the Dominant Value Explanation? 
Table IV reports estimation results of Fama and MacBeth (1973) regressions in which expected 
returns of the value effect are regressed on the proxies for the nine explanations of the value 




 Columns (1) to (9) report the slope estimates of univariate regressions. The nine slope 
estimates have the correct sign and they are statistically significant, which is consistent with the 
findings in the original studies. Column (10) reports the slope estimates of the multivariate 
regression. Duration accounts for the largest part of the value effect. A one-standard deviation 
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in duration is associated with expected value returns of -0.09% per month (t-statistic -2.78) and 
accounts for about half of the value effect (0.09 out of 0.16 is 0.55%). The second largest part of 
the value effect is explained by investors’ reaction to intangible information. A one-standard 
deviation in the reaction to intangible information is associated with expected value returns 
of -0.03% per month (t-statistic -3.15) which is only about a fifth of the value effect (0.03 out of 
0.16 is 0.18). The other explanations each account for a tenth of the value effect at most. 
 The empirical findings suggest therefore that duration (Dechow, Sloan and Soliman, 2007; 
Da, 2009) is the dominant explanation of the value effect. They also suggest that the book-to-
market equity is not a catch-all proxy for multiple omitted factors (Ball, 1978; Berk, 1995).  
 
 
5. In- Versus Out-Of-Sample Findings 
Is the part of the value effect that is explained by duration the result of rational or irrational 
expectations? Dechow, Sloan and Soliman (2007) argue that duration reflects risk similar to 
duration in fixed income securities. 
 I compare the slope estimates from the main regression specification using in-sample and 
out-of-sample data to better understand whether duration explains the value effect because of 
rational or irrational expectations. If duration explains the value effect because of rational 
expectations, I expect to find the same slope estimates in- and out-of-sample. If duration explains 
the value effect because of irrational expectations, however, I expect to find slope estimates that 
are smaller out-of-sample. 
 Table V reports estimation results of Fama and MacBeth (1973) regressions of the expected 
value returns on proxies for value explanations. Column (1) reports the in-sample estimates using 
data from July 1968 to June 1963. I find that duration is the dominant explanation of the value 
effect in-sample. A one-standard deviation in duration is associated with expected value returns 
of -0.21% per month (t-statistic of -3.73) which accounts for almost the entire value effect. (0.21 
out of 0.24 is 88%). The in-sample slope estimates are similar to the full-sample slope estimate. 
 Column (2) reports the out-of-sample estimates using data from July 1963 to December 2019. 
I also find that duration is the dominant explanation of the value effect out-of-sample. A one-
standard deviation in duration is associated with expected value returns of -0.05% per month 
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(t-statistic of -1.02) which accounts for about half of the value effect (0.05 out of 0.09 is 55%). 
The estimate is not statistically significant however. 
 Column (3) reports the difference between the in- and the out-of-sample slope estimates 
along with t-statistics for the null hypothesis that the difference is zero. I find that duration has a 
slope estimate that is 0.08% per month (t-statistic 1.02) smaller out-of-sample and that the 
difference is not statistically significant. It is not clear what economic inference one should draw 
from this test. On one hand, the large difference suggest that duration may be a result of 
irrational expectations. This is related to McLean and Pontiff’s (2016) finding that the average 
anomaly portfolio return is 59% smaller post-publication consistent with sophisticated investors 
learning about mispricing. On the other hand, however, the difference is not statistically 
significant and may suggests that duration is a result of rational expectations. This is related to 
Fama and French’s (2020) finding that the value effect is smaller out-of-sample but that the effect 









What explains the higher returns of stocks with high book-to-market equity over stocks with low 
book-to-market equity (Fama and French, 1992)? The literature puts forward nine explanations: 
Exposure to the systematic value factor (Fama and French, 1993), investors’ over-reaction to past 
growth (Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1994), financial leverage (Bhandari, 1988), operating 
leverage (Carlson, Fisher and Giammarino, 2004; Zhang, 2005; Novy-Marx, 2011), cashflow risk 
(Campbell and Vuolteenaho, 2004; Da and Warachka, 2009), consumption risk (Parker and 
Julliard, 2005; Bansal, Dittmar, and Lundblad, 2005), duration risk (Dechow, Sloan, and Soliman, 
2004; Da, 2009), investor’s reaction to intangible information (Daniel and Titman, 2006), and 
exposure to investment-specific technology shocks (Kogan and Papanikolaou, 2014). 
 In this paper, I simultaneously study these nine explanations to better understand what the 
dominant explanation of the value effect is. Specifically, I estimate Fama and MacBeth (1973) 
regressions in which the expected returns of the value effect are regressed on proxies for the 
explanations of the value effect. If the value effect is the result of one dominant explanation, I 
expect to find one significant slope estimate. If the value effect is the result of multiple 
explanations because book-to-market equity is a catch-all variable for multiple factors (Ball, 1978; 
Berk, 1995), then I expect to find multiple significant slope estimates. 
 My empirical findings suggest that duration is the dominant explanation of the value effect. 
Duration accounts for about half of the value effect in the full sample from July 1968 to December 
2019. Also, duration accounts for almost the entire value effect in the original value study’s 
sample period and for more than half of the value effect out-of-sample. The other eight 
explanations account for a statistically significant amount of the value effect, but the effects are 
economically negligible. 
 Dechow, Sloan, and Soliman (2004) and Da (2009) argue that duration explains the value 
effect because of risk. I estimate the above Fama and MacBeth (1973) regression using in-sample 
and out-of-sample data, and then study the difference in the estimates to better understand 
whether duration explains the value effect because of rational or irrational expectations. I find a 
large difference between the in- and the out-of-sample estimates that suggests that duration 
may explain the value effect because of irrational expectations. I also find, however, that the 
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difference is not statistically significant. This suggests that the duration may explain the value 
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Explanations of the Value Effect 
This table provides an overview of the explanations of the value effect that are put forward in the literature.  
Variable Study Definition 
Beta HML Fama and French (1993) Beta of returns with the HML portfolio of the Fama and French 
(1993) three-factor model estimated using the previous five years 
Sales Growth Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny 
(1994) 
Average annual growth in sales over the previous five years using 
the weights 5, 4, 3, 2, and 1 
Operating Leverage Carlson, Fisher and Giammarino 
(2004), Zhang (2005), Novy-Marx 
(2011) 
Cost of goods sold plus selling, general, and administrative expenses 
divided by total assets, (COGS+XSGA)/AT 
Financial Leverage Bhandari (1988), Fama and French 
(1993), Penman, Richardson, Tuna 
(2007) 
Current liabilities and long-term liabilities to total assets, 
(DLC+DLTT)/AT 
Cashflow Risk Campbell and Vuolteenaho 
(2004), Da and Warachka (2009) 
Beta of returns with news about cashflow of 10 book-to-market 
equity sorted portfolios as in Campbell and Vuolteenaho (2004) 
Consumption Risk Parker and Julliard (2005), Bansal, 
Dittmar, and Lundblad (2005) 
Beta of returns with consumption growth of 10 book-to-market 
equity sorted portfolios as in Parker and Julliard (2005) 
Beta IMC Kogan and Papanikolaou (2014) Beta of returns with the IMC portfolio of 10 book-to-market equity 
sorted portfolios as in Kogan and Papanikolaou (2014)  
Duration Dechow, Sloan, and Soliman 
(2004), Da (2009) 
Infinite sum of discounted dividend growth rates of 10 book-to-
market equity sorted portfolios as in Dechow, Sloan, and Soliman 
(2004) 
Reaction to Int. 
Information 
Daniel and Titman (2006) The residual from monthly cross-sectional regression of returns over 
five years on the change in book equity over five years conditional 
on share issuance as in Daniel and Titman (2006) 
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Table II 
Correlations between Value Explanations, 1968-2019 
This table reports the correlations between the proxies of the value explanations from 1968 to 2019. All variables are defined in Table I. 
I require non-missing observations for the nine proxies of the value explanation. The proxies are winsorized at 0.5% and 99.5% in each 
month, and then standardized in each month. 
 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Beta HML (1) 1.00                 
Sales Growth (2) -0.11 1.00        
Financial Leverage (3) 0.11 0.05 1.00       
Operating Leverage (4) 0.04 -0.07 -0.12 1.00      
Reaction to Int. Information (5) -0.13 0.12 -0.03 0.00 1.00     
Cashflow Risk (6) 0.16 -0.17 0.09 0.05 -0.70 1.00    
Consumption Risk (7) 0.19 -0.21 0.09 0.05 -0.80 0.91 1.00   
Duration (8) -0.19 0.21 -0.07 -0.04 0.77 -0.66 -0.90 1.00  




Value Effect, 1968-2019 
This table reports estimation results of Fama and MacBeth (1973) regressions in which one-
month ahead returns, !"#$%&'(, are regressed on the natural logarithm of book-to-market 
equity, ln +,-.
/-.
0, and on the natural logarithm of market equity, ln(2'(). 
 







+ T7( ⋅ ln(2'()				 
 
The variables are defined as in Fama and French (1992). I require non-missing observations for 
the nine proxies of the value explanation. The right-hand side variables are winsorized at 0.5% 
and 99.5% in each month. t-statistics are in reported parenthesis. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Sample 1968-2019 1968-2019 1968-1992 1993-2019 
ln(B/M) 0.29 0.20 0.31 0.10 
 (4.13) (3.12) (3.67) (1.05) 
ln(M)  -0.06 -0.07 -0.06 
  (-1.70) (-1.21) (-1.19) 
Constant 1.30 1.58 1.58 1.57 




Value Explanations in the Full Sample, 1968-2019 
This Table reports the estimation results of Fama and MacBeth (1973) regressions in which the expected returns of the value effect 
are regressed on nine proxies of the explanations of the value effect from July 1968 to December 2019. All variables are defined in 
Table I. The right-hand side variables are winsorized at 0.5% and 99.5% in each month, and standardized in each month. I require non-
missing observations for the nine proxies of the value explanation. t-statistics are in parenthesis. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Beta HML 0.03         0.00 
 (1.85)         (2.11) 
Sales Growth  -0.04        0.00 
  (-3.98)        (3.31) 
Financial Leverage   0.02       0.00 
   (3.80)       (4.52) 
Operating Leverage    0.02      0.00 
    (3.00)      (4.57) 
Reaction to Int. Information     -0.13     -0.03 
     (-2.85)     (-3.15) 
Cashflow Risk      0.13    0.02 
      (2.76)    (2.28) 
Consumption Risk       0.15   0.02 
       (2.78)   (2.21) 
Duration        -0.14  -0.09 
        (-2.80)  (-2.78) 
Beta IMC         -0.11 0.01 
         (-2.75) (2.47) 
Constant -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 
 (-1.13) (-1.13) (-1.13) (-1.13) (-1.13) (-1.13) (-1.13) (-1.13) (-1.13) (-1.13) 
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Table V 
In-Sample Versus Out-Of-Sample Comparison 
This table compares the in-sample and the out-of-sample estimation results of Fama and 
MacBeth (1973) regressions in which the expected returns of the value effect are regressed on 
nine proxies of the explanations of the value effect. The third column reports the difference 
between the in-sample and the out-of-sample estimates with a hypothesis test for their 
difference. The in-sample period is July 1968 to June 1993, and the out-of-sample period is July 
1993 to December 2019. All variables are defined in Table I. The right-hand side variables are 
winsorized at 0.5% and 99.5% in each month, and standardized in each month. I require non-
missing observations for the nine proxies of the value explanation. t-statistics are in parenthesis. 
 
 IS OOS Difference 
Beta HML 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (2.68) (1.07) (0.23) 
Sales Growth -0.01 0.00 0.00 
 (-3.53) (0.91) (2.28) 
Financial Leverage 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (2.07) (4.33) (1.47) 
Operating Leverage 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (3.64) (2.96) (0.01) 
Reaction to Int. Information -0.04 -0.03 0.01 
 (-3.61) (-1.55) (0.56) 
Cashflow Risk 0.04 0.01 -0.04 
 (3.79) (0.32) (-1.82) 
Consumption Risk 0.03 0.02 -0.01 
 (2.71) (1.14) (-0.23) 
Duration -0.13 -0.05 0.08 
 (-3.43) (-1.02) (1.19) 
Beta IMC 0.01 0.02 0.01 






Value Explanations In-Sample, 1968-1992 
This Table reports the estimation results of Fama and MacBeth (1973) regressions in which the expected returns of the value effect 
are regressed on nine proxies of the explanations of the value effect from July 1968 to June 1993. All variables are defined in Table I. 
The right-hand side variables are winsorized at 0.5% and 99.5% in each month, and standardized in each month. I require non-missing 
observations for the nine proxies of the value explanation. t-statistics are in parenthesis. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Beta HML 0.06         0.00 
 (3.75)  
       (2.68) 
Sales Growth  -0.07        -0.01 
 
 (-3.71)        (-3.53) 
Financial Leverage   0.02       0.00 
 
  (3.03)       (2.07) 
Operating Leverage    0.02      0.00 
 
   (1.85)      (3.64) 
Reaction to Int. Information     -0.19     -0.04 
 
    (-3.84)     (-3.61) 
Cashflow Risk      0.18    0.04 
 
     (3.71)    (3.79) 
Consumption Risk       0.21   0.03 
 
      (3.72)   (2.71) 
Duration        -0.21  -0.13 
 
       (-3.73)  (-3.43) 
Beta IMC         (-0.16) 0.01 
 
        (-3.68) (1.67) 
Constant -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 




Value Explanations Out-Of-Sample, 1993-2019 
This Table reports the estimation results of Fama and MacBeth (1973) regressions in which the expected returns of the value effect 
are regressed on nine proxies of the explanations of the value effect from July 1993 to December 2019. All variables are defined in 
Table I. The right-hand side variables are winsorized at 0.5% and 99.5% in each month, and standardized in each month. I require non-
missing observations for the nine proxies of the value explanation. t-statistics are in parenthesis. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Beta HML 0.00         0.00 
 (0.04)         (1.07) 
Sales Growth  -0.02        0.00 
  (-1.68)        (0.91) 
Financial Leverage   0.02       0.00 
   (2.42)       (4.33) 
Operating Leverage    0.02      0.00 
    (2.50)      (2.96) 
Reaction to Int. Information     -0.08     -0.03 
     (-1.05)     (-1.55) 
Cashflow Risk      0.08    0.01 
      (0.99)    (0.32) 
Consumption Risk       0.08   0.02 
       (0.97)   (1.14) 
Duration        -0.08  -0.05 
        (-0.96)  (-1.02) 
Beta IMC         -0.06 0.02 
         (-0.92) (1.93) 
Constant -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 
 (-0.34) (-0.34) (-0.34) (-0.34) (-0.34) (-0.34) (-0.34) (-0.34) (-0.34) (-0.34) 
 
